Haitians waiting for travel to the United States sit secured to the floor of a C-17 Globemaster III on 18 February 2010 at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The 17th Airlift Squadron from Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, volunteered to transport passengers who otherwise would have had to wait hours or even days for another flight to the United States. (US Air Force photo/SSgt Shawn Weismiller)

First Lieutenant Jonathan Lipsey, a C-130 Hercules navigator with the 908th Airlift Wing, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, helps load earthquake patients onto a C-130 with Airmen from the 45th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, MacDill AFB, Florida, at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 25 January 2010. (US Air Force photo/MSgt Jeremy Lock)

On 17 January 2010, airplanes at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, parked prior to being offloaded in support of earthquake relief efforts. (US Navy photo/MC2 Justin Stumberg)

SSgt Richard Miner, a loadmaster assigned to the 43d Operational Support Squadron, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, conducts a joint airdrop inspection at Pope Air Force Base aboard a C-17 Globemaster III from the 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, before an airdrop mission on 21 January 2010. (US Air Force photo/SSgt Jacob N. Bailey)

On 21 January 2010, SMSgt James Bennett, an Air National Guard C-17 loadmaster, takes time out from his job to hold a Haitian baby for a mother who was asleep from exhaustion at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (US Air Force Photo/MSgt Alvin Johnson)
OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

Air Mobility Command’s Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake Crisis

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General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), often reminds his staff that, “AMC will never be the subject of the sentence. And, I’m OK with that.” By that phrase, he refers to the fact that AMC will always be the supporting (and by extension, not the supported) command during any contingency operation. That’s not to say that the command’s role is not critical, as AMC provides the Rapid Global Air Mobility, on which all of the other combatant commands rely to accomplish their missions.

AMC’s role in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE illustrates this point well. Whether assisting with command and control issues, providing air refueling to the initial responding forces, evaluating and operating airfields, airlifting humanitarian aid and ground support forces, or evacuating casualty patients and American citizens, the command’s personnel proved themselves essential to this United States Southern Command operation. The commander’s headquarters staff worked a variety of issues and sought to keep the information and mission requirements flowing. At the same time, Eighteenth Air Force and its subordinate wings and groups responded to every task with professionalism and the speed required of this humanitarian crisis, while still sustaining the command’s worldwide mobility commitments.
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OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND’S RESPONSE TO THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE CRISIS

Introduction

On the afternoon of 12 January 2010, a major earthquake, measuring 7.0 on the Richter magnitude scale, struck the Caribbean nation of Haiti near the capital city of Port-au-Prince. This natural disaster caused significant destruction, with casualties in excess of 112,000 deaths and 194,000 injuries, plus an additional 500,000 Haitians in need of humanitarian assistance. Haitian President Rene Preval declared a national state of emergency and requested international help. Soon after the earthquake, international news agencies began broadcasting the crisis around the world. The devastation in Haiti, already one of the world’s poorest nations, caused a global outcry of sympathy and support. President Barak Obama declared the United States would provide its full support in the humanitarian assistance effort already underway.1

As soon as Lieutenant General Vern M. “Rusty” Findley II, Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC), saw the news reports on the situation in Haiti, at approximately 1630 Central Standard Time on 12 January, he sent an e-mail to Major General Mark S. Solo, Commander, 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), and Brigadier General Randy A. Kee, Vice Commander, 618 TACC, warning them to “get ready.” General Findley had seen the response required from AMC for other recent disasters such as Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, as well as the Georgian relief effort. Haiti, so near the United States’ southern coast, offered some advantages for air mobility operations, but the state of the crisis and the Command’s other worldwide commitments also offered many challenges.2

Because of their proximity at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and expertise in directing initial operations at austere locations, members of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) were among the first to respond. AFSOC’s 623d Air

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2Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10.
and Space Operations Center (AOC) established an initial command and control element at Hurlburt Field. AFSOC also deployed a small force to Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti. Their combat controllers quickly set up initial operations, assisting the Haitian airfield managers, while other personnel established preliminary security and communications. As follow-on forces arrived, they melded operations with AFSOC personnel and eventually took over responsibility, but during the initial days, AFSOC played a critical part in the humanitarian effort.3

At the time of the earthquake, AMC was already heavily supporting worldwide operations, including two combat theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, most of the personnel assigned to the 618 TACC, AMC’s air and space operations center, were focused on the surge operations for the Department of Defense’s Afghan plus-up. Moving additional troops and equipment halfway around the world on the timetable required by the US Army entailed a substantial logistical feat in its own right. Adding a large humanitarian operation, as the Haiti disaster would become, meant the 618 TACC mission planners had to shift from an almost single-minded focus of accelerating the airflow and increasing the number of arrivals in Afghanistan to including the building of a plan on how they were going to support a sizeable airflow to Haiti. Because of the commitments in Afghanistan, this had to be done with minimal interruption to that airflow.4

General Findley’s forecast came about rapidly. Early on the morning of 13 January, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a warning order alerting AMC’s airlift and contingency response elements. The warning order also directed AMC to assign a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern). A JCS execution order (modified five times during the operation) followed on the 14th. Even before the execution order had been issued, a C-17A from the 60th Air Mobility Wing, Travis Air Force Base, California, conducted the first AMC Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE mission to the airport at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, delivering the the California Task Force 2 Urban Search and Rescue Team, plus 82,600 pounds of equipment, on 14 January. On 16 January, a 62d Airlift Wing C-17A, from McChord Air Force Base, Washington, delivered the New York Task Force 1 Urban Search and Rescue Team.5


5Msg (C/Decl 140336Z Jan 2010), CJCS to CDR USSOUTHCOM(MC) et al, “Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Relief EXORD (U),” 140336Z Jan 10, info used is Unclassified; Intvw (U),
Command and Control

As is the case in most international humanitarian situations, the Department of State (DoS) was designated the lead agency for the Haitian relief efforts. The Department of Defense (DoD) took on a supporting role at the national level, providing much of the execution effort. Within the DoD, the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), stationed in Miami, Florida, became the lead because the Caribbean fell within this combatant command’s area of responsibility. US Air Force General Douglas M. Fraser, Commander, USSOUTHCOM, stated that the primary military goal centered on providing foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and hastening a long-term recovery. To accomplish this, he appointed US Army Lieutenant General P. K. Keen, Deputy Commander, USSOUTHCOM, as the Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF)-Haiti, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. By coincidence, General Keen happened to be in Haiti to meet with local security officials at the time of the earthquake. In fact, the only US Air Force casualty was Major Kenneth D. Bourland, who had accompanied General Keen to Port-au-Prince that morning.6

To accomplish this goal, USSOUTHCOM established a five-phased operation. Phase I was emergency response. Essentially, this consisted of immediate lifesaving steps such as delivering the search and rescue teams, establishing a situational awareness, deploying the initial forces into Haiti, and setting up port operations. Delivery of humanitarian aid and evacuation of American citizens and casualties would begin, but would not become the focus of this relatively short phase. Phase II was the relief phase. Here, the focus shifted to establishing medical support and distributing food, water, and aid. It also included reestablishing critical infrastructure and shelters. While other government agencies and non-governmental organizations supported this effort, the bulk of activity remained with the US military. Initially, this requirement rested heavily on airlift assets

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6 Msg (FOUO), CDRUSSOUTHCOM to CJCS et al, “CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD/CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD,” 161330Z Jan 10, info used is not FOUO; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10.
because of the speed with which those aircraft could deliver aid, but also because of the heavily damaged infrastructure on Port-au-Prince’s seaport.7

In Phase III, restoration, the bulk of the US military assets in Haiti would redeploy as the need for humanitarian relief decreased. While USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti would remain involved through the remainder of the recovery, most of the continued relief effort and reconstruction of key infrastructure would transition to other government and non-governmental organizations. Phase IV was labeled stabilization, as these entities supported the re-establishment of a legitimate civil government and assisted with the provision of basic services to the population. The final phase, recovery, would occur over the longer term as the Haitian government re-established the infrastructure and basic services.8

Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH), Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, served as the air component for USSOUTHCOM. As such, AFSOUTH established the concept of operations, special instructions, and guidance for the air portion of this humanitarian relief effort. Responsibility ranged from command and control to flight planning to airspace coordination. Its 612th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC), also at Davis Monthan, became the Air Force’s primary command and control element for Haiti operations. AFSOUTH, however, worked closely with First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) (AFNORTH), Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Because of its previous humanitarian operations experience in the continental United States, AFNORTH brought several key elements, including numerous already-established working relationships with various government and non-governmental organizations. AFNORTH and its 601 AOC also served as the focal point for the return of American citizens from Haiti to the US, known as Operation SAFE RETURN.9

In large part, because of the chaos brought on by the earthquake at the Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport and the immense

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7Msg (FOUO), CDRUSSOUTHCOM to CJCS et al, “CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD/CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD,” 161330Z Jan 10, info used is not FOUO; Slides (Pre-Decisional/FOUO), Ms. Shelly Alvirez, USSOUTHCOM/SC-PS(L), “USSOUTHCOM Strategic Framework: Operation Unified Response, Transition to Long-Term Engagement,” 6 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO.

8See note above, info used is not FOUO; Slides (Pre-Decisional/FOUO), USSOUTHCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Draft Concept of Support,” 16 Jan 10, info used is not FOUO.

9Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “AF-SOUTH Special Instructions for JTF--Haiti (Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE),” Change 20, 10 Mar 10 (original date 18 Jan 10); Slides (U), Col Byron Mathewson, 612 CAOC/CPD Chief, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Airspace Coordination Concept,” 22 Jan 10; Slides (U), AFNORTH, “AMD Haiti Relief,” 28 Jan 10.
international response, aircraft from all over the world arrived unscheduled. This jumbled approach quickly proved inefficient and created critical safety hazards. As coordinating air traffic into Haiti and parking spaces at the airport was arguably the most pressing issue, members of JTF-Haiti and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) negotiated with the Haitian government for temporary control of Haiti’s airspace, beginning on 15 January 2010. (While gaining full authority to manage Haitian airspace, US negotiators were careful to emphasize this was temporary control and not any type of “ownership.”) With this control, AFNORTH, exploiting its humanitarian operations experience and its vicinity vis-à-vis Haiti, established the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) at Tyndall Air Force Base. The HFOCC was doctrinally a Regional Air Movement Control Center designed to manage the airspace into and out of Haiti. Using AFNORTH’s already-established working relationships, the HFOCC, in close coordination with the FAA, helped to bring order to the airflow.10

The primary step the HFOCC took was to establish an airflow slot system. The parking ramp at the Port-au-Prince airport had 10 aircraft spots (although helicopters and some of the smaller aircraft could be parked on the grassy areas). Under the slot system, a requesting aircrew was allotted a specific time to arrive in Haiti and allowed a maximum of two hours on the ground. This provided predictability for aircraft arrivals and departures and ensured the most continuous and expeditious delivery of cargo, e.g., humanitarian aid and relief workers. This system allowed the HFOCC to schedule upwards of 170 aircraft per day, of which the US government (the vast majority US Air Force) received 30 to 35 percent, US civilian organizations gained 35 to 40 percent, and United Nations and international aircraft accounted for the remainder. Under this system, Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) airlift (whether delivering humanitarian aid, troops and equipment of the 82d Airborne Division, or materials and personnel to operate the Port-au-Prince airport) had to compete for slot times. As a general rule, AMC could fill any available slots with enough notice to schedule and prepare a flight, primarily from Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, or Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. With AMC’s heavy commitment to the operation, the Command continually sought as many scheduled slots as it could get.11

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11See note above; Slides (U), AFNORTH, “AMD HaitiRelief,” 28 Jan 10; Slides (U), USSOUTHCOM/SE-RSC, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Airfield Slot Management CONOPS and Technical
As seen with the establishment of the slot time system, the initial stages of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE were chaotic. It is into this convoluted, yet cooperative, command and control structure that the personnel of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSOCOM) and its air component, the Air Mobility Command, as the force provider, found themselves. As Lieutenant General Vern M. Findley II, AMC Vice Commander, noted:

General Fraser, the USSOUTHCOM Commander, [later] admitted that they were in a bit of disarray at the beginning\textsuperscript{12} trying to sort things out, which led to a little bit of confusion. I think we and USTRANSOCOM were doing the best we could to stay in front of things, and I think we did a pretty good job of that. As can be the case, these things don’t happen in a straight line. That’s one thing you’ve got to understand when you are going into them: there’s going to be chaos; there’s going to be questions you never even thought of, like orphans and that kind of stuff that you just have to deal with and deal with appropriately when they come up.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}This was in part because USSOUTHCOM, as the supported combatant command, did not have a typical “J” organizational structure, and other organizations had to figure out which offices did what.

\textsuperscript{13}Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10.
Managing the Mobility Air Forces

Planners fully understood that until the seaport could be repaired, operations would rely heavily on airlift, principally to the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This airlift, primarily C-17s and C-130s, utilized aircraft from throughout the Mobility Air Forces, which included the Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Education and Training Command, Pacific Air Forces, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard. As the single manager for air mobility, Headquarters AMC, at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, provided the oversight for these forces. Eighteenth Air Force, AMC’s only numbered air force, also at Scott Air Force Base, tasked and executed air mobility missions. The 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), AMC’s air and space operations center at Scott Air Force Base, functioned as the mobility operations hub, planning and directing airlift and air refueling operations. Once the seaport opened, plans called for the reduction of airlift operations.14

For AMC, as the force provider, the key to working with US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH), and First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) (AFNORTH) was communications. With its resident knowledge of air mobility operations in humanitarian situations, AMC and, in particular, the 618 TACC were often able to address issues as they arose (in some cases even before). As General Vern M. Findley II, AMC Vice Commander, noted, resolving issues often depended on “…a lot of making sure we asked the right questions and keep the right people talking to each other, and then we were always able to resolve them.”15 In fact, the various Air Force air and space operations centers had started building a more substantial network over the previous year. In particular, the AOC vice commanders had established an “e-mail discussion chat room” specifically to discuss the issues common amongst these operational hubs. This open communication channel also allowed faster coordination during major events and crises. In the fall of 2009, Brigadier General Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC Vice Commander, used this to work closely with his counterpart at the Pacific Air Forces’ 613 AOC during the humanitarian response after an earthquake struck near American Samoa. Based on this success, General Kee was then able to use this communication method again during response to the Haiti disaster, first with Air Force Special Operation Command’s 623d Air

14Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10; Fact Sheet (U), AMC/PA, “Air Mobility Command,” Dec 08.

15Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10.
and Space Operations Center (AOC), as the initial responders, and subsequently with the 612 and 601 AOCs.\footnote{Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10.}

Essential to this communications effort was establishing a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) and an Air Mobility Division (AMD) at AFSOUTH to serve as a link between strategic airlift and theater airlift requirements. During 2009, Eighteenth Air Force had established memoranda of agreements with other numbered air forces, specifically addressing the establishment of DIRMOBFOR and AMD staffs during contingencies. The DIRMOBFOR served as the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s (CFACC) coordinating authority for air mobility requirements. The AOC’s AMD ensured the planning and execution of air mobility operations met the Joint Force Commander’s priorities. Under this plan, Lieutenant General Glenn F. Spears, Commander, Twelfth Air Force, remained the CFACC, with overall air responsibility for the operation. AMC appointed Brigadier General Robert K. Millmann, Jr., the Mobilization Assistant to the Eighteenth Air Force commander, as the DIRMOBFOR and sent him to Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. General Millmann had served as the DIRMOBFOR during hurricanes Gustav, Hanna, and Ike in 2008. General Millmann, with concurrence from General Douglas M. Fraser, USSOUTHCOM Commander, and General Spears, established the DIRMOBFOR and AMD offices at Davis Monthan Air Force Base to work more closely with the 612 AOC. AMC established an AMD office and appointed another DIRMOBFOR, which was Colonel Warren H. Hurst, for the 601 AOC at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida.\footnote{AMCI 10-202 Vol. 7 (U), AMC/A3M, “Director of Mobility Forces-Air Policy and Procedures,” 25 Feb 08; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, with Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10; MOA (U), 1 AF (AFNORTH) and 18 AF (AFTRANS), “Director of Mobility Forces-Air Support to 1AF (AFNORTH),” 18 Aug 09; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10; Rpt (FOUO), 601 AOC/AMD, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center, After Action Report,” Feb 10, info used is not FOUO.}

For General Millmann, it made sense to keep the mobility experts in the 618 TACC fully engaged, as well as to tap into the Regional Air Movement Control Center (known as RAMCC) expertise of the 601 AOC. With the concurrence of Lieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, Commander of Eighteenth Air Force, and Major General Garry C. Dean, Commander of AFNORTH, the 618 TACC’s Contingency Response Cell (CRC) and the 601 AOC’s newly designated Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) took up supporting roles, partnering directly with the 612 AOC. Using an international Notice to Airmen, the HFOCC staff directed all pilots to contact them to arrange a scheduled slot
time before flying to Haiti. The CRC ensured the 618 TACC focused on the Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE execution effort and further streamlined the process by managing flight operations through the Global Decision Support System (GDSS). Using GDSS and other electronic communications systems, the 601 AOC DIRMOBFOR essentially executed directional authority over flights into and out of Haiti's airspace. It’s worth noting that aircraft still occasionally showed up unannounced, but, on the whole, this system provided an organized approach and expedited the aid which poured into the airport.\(^{18}\)

Aeromedical evacuation (AE) missions provided the principal exception. Here, the 618 TACC exercised command and control of AE assets. They executed the AE missions using the slot system. Even before this could happen, the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Global Patient Movement Requirements Center validated the patient movement requests, and the US Department of Homeland Security granted humanitarian parole status to Haitian patients. To assist with the overall airlift command and control, two AE personnel arrived at the 601 AOC on 21 January 2010 (a third arrived on the 25th). These AE liaisons brought an expanded understanding of the AE system to the HFOCC, helping develop a more complete grasp of the mission. From this, the HFOCC established a dedicated slot-time for a daily AE mission. Prior to this, the 618 TACC had reallocated an AMC slot to cover AE requirements.\(^{19}\)

Like the 618 TACC CRC, Headquarters AMC also activated its Crisis Action Team (CAT) on 14 January to assist with the operation’s daily planning. The CAT’s primary purpose was to accelerate taskings and the information flow through the AMC staff. This CAT also allowed a validation of a new procedure developed after Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. Initially, the full CAT stood up, but then was tailored down to the senior staff only (CAT director, deputy, executive officer, and administrator) during the evening and night shifts. The remainder of the CAT staff operated during the day and remained on recall. Periodic exceptions occurred as required; for example, the Staff Judge Advocate office placed an Operations and International Law attorney on the CAT floor 24 hours a day for the first portion of the operation, as various questions about air transportation eligibility

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\(^{18}\) Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10; Rpt (FOUO), 601 AOC/AMD, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center, After Action Report,” Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; E-Mail (U), Paul S. Williams, AMC/A3X, to ACC Operations Center et al, “618 TACC Contingency Response Cell Deactivation Message,” 11 Feb 10.

\(^{19}\) Slides (U), AFNORTH, “AMD Haiti Relief,” 28 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, with Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10; Rpt (FOUO), 601 AOC/AMD, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center, After Action Report,” Feb 10, info used is not FOUO.
and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement authority arose. On 27 January, AMC reduced the “live” CAT to the executive officer only, with all others on call to report within two hours, and returned it to normal duty operations on the 29th.20

The AMC CAT and 618 TACC CRC answered many questions and worked numerous issues to make this a successful operation. These ranged from transporting human remains from Haiti to the US to reacting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff changing the airlift top priority to the 82d Airborne Division. While only a couple of examples are presented at this point, many more were worked throughout the operation (several of which are discussed within the sections that follow). One of the very first to be addressed involved ensuring enough C-17s were dedicated to the airlift. Using Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, as the hub of operations, AMC requested initial C-17 support from around the Mobility Air Forces, including the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), Air National Guard (ANG), Air Education and Training Command (AETC), and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). All contributed what they had available. In fact, AETC’s 97th Air Mobility Wing, the C-17 training unit at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, as the closer available pool, dedicated nearly its whole fleet to Haiti. AMC planners realized that holding these aircraft too long would impact the training mission. In fact, Lieutenant General Vern M. Findley II, the AMC Vice Commander, in a 20 January operations review meeting, noted that although the worst thing possible would be to not have enough aircraft, “The second worst thing, under employing those we borrowed.”21 To that end, the 618 TACC closely monitored aircraft utilization. As PACAF aircraft arrived and operations stabilized, the 618 TACC started releasing AETC’s aircraft. The final aircraft and aircrews returned to Altus Air Force Base by 24 January. Still, it took until late April to recover the lost training for that two-week period. PACAF sent a total of eight aircraft, all of which returned home by 27 January. AFRC and ANG C-17s augmented AMC’s aircraft throughout the operation.22

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In addition to ensuring the appropriate amount of airlift was available, the staff focused a lot of attention on making sure the requirements were properly identified and sent to the aerial port of embarkation (APOE). Initially, the US Department of State and non-governmental organizations began sending relief supplies to Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida. In one way, this made sense as the Miami area offered a close aerial port. However, Homestead was not equipped nor manned for large aerial port operations. As a smaller base, it also did not have room for a large staging area and had a very limited C-17 maximum-on-ground capacity. Working with AFRC, AMC sourced material handling equipment and personnel to deploy to Homestead Air Reserve Base and help them dig out. General Kee, as the vice commander of 618 TACC, also worked with USTRANSCOM and the US Department of State to identify and redirect relief supplies. USTRANSCOM, through the 618 TACC, selected Charleston Air Force Base as the primary APOE and Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida, as the primary seaport. Other locations, including Homestead Air Reserve Base, served as smaller aerial ports for the operation. As the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division developed, C-130 operations began staging out of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina (which was co-located with Fort Bragg).  

In order to ensure equipment and personnel airlift requirements were properly identified, mission planners generally relied on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), a computer-based application for developing and implementing operations plans. Within JOPES, airlift mission planners relied on a developed and validated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) plan to lay out the personnel and equipment requirements. During the initial stages of a large humanitarian mission, like Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, a TPFDD may not have time to develop fully. For the 618 TACC mission planners, this meant that aircraft loads may have been short, and priorities may be out of balance. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division the top priority, many requirements shifted, but changing requirements and priorities meant that even what should have been a more standard force deployment quickly outpaced the planning. At one AMC operation review meeting, a mission planner described the situation as “very turbulent in TPFDD,” but that they were working it. By this, he meant that AMC JOPES planners had been deployed to First and Twelfth Air Forces to assist the process. (Even here, without


a requirement built into the TPFDD, AMC relied on USTRANSCOM's unit line numbers, which were tied to emergency and special program funding codes, to get personnel in place.) Particularly to keep the 82d Airborne Division's deployment moving forward, 618 TACC planners relied on loadmasters and cargo marshals to input the load information on-scene. This gave mission planners little visibility from which to continue arranging future missions, but provided an understanding that current aircraft commitments were being fully utilized.25

The situation was equally bad at Port-au-Prince during the initial days. Manifests for outgoing passengers and cargo were frequently done on yellow sticky pads and scrap pieces of paper because communications were unavailable or unreliable through the standard tracking method in the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES). The Department of State made the call on who-US citizens, orphans/adoptees, and humanitarian parolees (generally medical patients)--could return to the US on mobility aircraft, but completeness of their data, combined with the ad hoc method of manifesting the passengers, meant the potential for errors, as well as problems, in the statistical data was ever present. Additionally, unlike recent US hurricane evacuations, not all manifest passengers had social security numbers, which was the common denominator used in GATES for tracking passengers. In order to address some of the concerns, including security and accountability, these various “manifests” were shipped to Scott Air Force Base on 26 January, and members of the AMC Directorate of Logistics staff entered all of this data into GATES by hand.26

Air mobility planners relied on numerous computer systems like JOPES and GATES, as well as e-mail and telephone communications. At the height of the operation, the 618 TACC CRC alone reported receiving over 700 e-mails per day and prepared various briefings as well as four different daily reports on the non-classified internet protocol router (NIPR) and secret internet protocol router networks. Still, planners proved very adaptive in getting the mission accomplished. During the early morning hours of Saturday, 23 January, a problem with a scheduled upgrade caused Scott Air Force Base, including the 618 TACC, to lose NIPR connectivity for 11 hours and 20 minutes. Mission planners relied on


26Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, with Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10; Rpt (U), AMC/A9, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: Air Mobility Command Lessons Learned Report,” ca 30 Apr 10.
fax machines, telephones, and other non-NIPR-network-based systems to move aircraft. The outage’s extended period resulted in part because communications specialists were initially unaware of the loss. To prevent that from recurring, the Network Operations and Security Center at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, sent a test message every hour, beginning on 25 January.27

At the 1 February AMC operations review meeting, General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., the AMC Commander, reminded everyone, “We’re not policymaking; we execute once the policy and fiscal issues are resolved.” Having said that, he went on to compliment the staff by telling them that he was impressed at how quickly the Command provided information, yet stayed out of the policy issues, and still remained ready to respond once those decisions were made.28 Working with AFSOUTH and AFNORTH, AMC ensured those decisions involving airlift and aeromedical evacuation operations were accomplished. AMC provided another key element to making this system work—the ground command and control brought by its contingency response forces.


28Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 1 Feb 10.
Joint Assessment Team

As the 612th Air and Space Operations Center and 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center personnel began looking at the options for long-term ground support at the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Toussaint Louverture International Airport, a trained Joint Assessment Team (JAT), headed by Colonel Gordon D. (Dean) Bridger, from the 621st Contingency Response Wing, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, volunteered to assess the airfield. At the time, this team was just finishing a training base opening operational readiness exercise at the Combat Readiness Training Center in Gulf Port, Mississippi. A JAT normally consisted of eight personnel sent to evaluate the suitability of an airfield for military operations: a colonel and a lieutenant colonel to lead, also referred to as “tea drinkers” since one of their primary tasks was to network local political leaders, airport directors, embassy personnel, and anyone else needed to ensure a smooth operation at the airfield; an airfield operations officer and two civil engineers to evaluate the airfield (principally its pavement); a security forces member to review security concerns; a communicator to manage the team’s communications requirements and evaluate any local resources; and a “wildcard” position, normally filled with an aerial porter to look at requirements to manage an airfield’s port and node requirements.29

Within about 24 hours of volunteering, the team, plus 6 additional security forces personnel, left Gulf Port for Haiti on a C-130. As the team did not have live ammunition for the training exercise, they obtained rounds for their weapons from nearby Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. They also procured some personal items and a red commercial tent to supplement their training gear. Upon arriving at Port-au-Prince airspace on the morning of 14 January 2010, the C-130 went into an hour-and-a-half to two-hour holding pattern before it could land. As they departed the aircraft, the team met a chaotic sight. Without anyone directing an overcrowded ramp, aircraft were parked too close together; smaller, propeller aircraft and a few helicopters were parked in the grassy infield. People and what few vehicles were available moved between and around aircraft.30

29Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Jeffrey K. Fallesen, 817 GMRS, 7 Apr 10; Rpt (U), AMC/A9, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: Air Mobility Command Lessons Learned Report,” ca 30 Apr 10.

30Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Jeffrey K. Fallesen, 817 GMRS, 7 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Shawn C. Underwood, 621 CRW, 8 Apr 10.
Because of the late start, Colonel Bridger’s JAT did not get much of a chance to assess the airfield before the 817th Contingency Response Group (CRG), from McGuire Air Force Base, began to arrive as the Air Force portion of the Joint Task Force-Port Opening a couple of hours later. Generally, the JAT gets approximately four hours to conduct an evaluation of the airfield and make a determination of its usability before the CRG departs home station. In this case, use of the airfield was not up for debate. Instead, the JAT inspected the control tower, and the damage it had suffered from the earthquake (cracks in the main structural pillars) did make it unsafe for use. The civil engineers did not measure the sturdiness of the runway, but did assess the ramps. While the team leaders conducted negotiations with the various Haitian, foreign, and non-governmental organizations already on the airfield, the rest of the team marked off an area for the CRG to set up their tent city near the parking apron, as well as a cargo marshalling yard for when the Army’s 688th Rapid Port Opening Element, from Fort Eustis, Virginia, arrived. After the 817 CRG arrived (discussed in the following section), the JAT members assisted them by building tents and unloading aircraft.31

While this was going on, General Millmann, the Director of Mobility Forces at the 612th Air and Space Operations Center, knew that operating the entire mission with one aerial port of debarkation offered a potential for numerous problems—one serious accident could shut down Port-au-Prince’s single runway and halt operations. He pressed for alternative locations, and political negotiations ensued with the Dominican Republic. On 16 January, the JAT moved, via C-130, from Port-au-Prince to San Isidro Air Base, the Dominican Republic’s largest military airfield, near Santo Domingo. At San Isidro, the JAT evaluated an airfield that was in great shape and began setting up for the 615th Contingency Response Element (CRE) from Travis Air Force Base, California. Using two C-17s from Travis’s 60th Air Mobility Wing, the 615 CRE flew to San Isidro, arriving on the 18th, to manage US operations on the base.32

The Dominican Republic government recommended the US also take a look at the Maria Montez International Airport in Barahona, near the Haitian border. So, the JAT moved to Barahona on 18 January. Colonel Bridger and Captain Erik F. Philipp, one of the civil engineers, flew to Barahona by helicopter, while the other six members of the team rented cars and drove. This drive was probably not the safest thing they could have done since part of it occurred at night and


32Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Shawn C. Underwood, 621 CRW, 8 Apr 10; Intvw Notes (U), Tim Hurst, AMC/A9L, with Col Quintin Hartt, 572 CRG, 25 Feb 10; Aircrew Brochure (U), 615 CRE Bravo, “San Isidro AB,” ca 21 Jan 10.
through a region known for its drug-smuggling problems. The Maria Montez airport had fallen somewhat into disrepair and had a lot of overgrowth. With the exception of the overgrowth, the team found the airfield suitable for C-130 and some C-17 operations. It took a bit (including telephone calls from the Dominican government) to convince the airfield manager that the Americans really wanted to bring in C-17 operations. Once they did, the Dominicans and JAT team members cleared the required space for the glide path and wing-tip clearances. For the next couple of days, the JAT, with additional aerial porters and a forklift borrowed from the 615 CRE, functioned as a mini CRE, while they waited for the 123 CRE, from the new 123 CRG in the Kentucky Air National Guard. The 123 CRG volunteered for the mission, even though they had not yet met their initial operational capability date. The 123 CRE arrived on 22 January, and, after a couple of days overlap, the JAT returned to San Isidro Air Base, expecting to return home to McGuire Air Force Base.\footnote{Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Shawn C. Underwood, 621 CRW, 8 Apr 10; Rpt (FOUO), AFOSI 2 FIR OL-BH, “Route Survey: San Isidro Dominican Republic Air Force Base to Barahona Airfield, Dominican Republic,” 20 Jan 10, info used is not FOUO; Article (U), Maj Dale Greer, 123 AW/PA, “123rd Supporting Earthquake Relief in Haiti,” 7 Feb 10; Aircrew Brochure (U), 123 CRE, “Maria Montez Intl. (MDBH),” ca 30 Jan 10.}

The team received one last tasking--to evaluate Las Americas International Airport near Santo Domingo to assess the possibility of getting this airfield into the system and take advantage of its presence. Conducting a traditional survey, the team found a busy international airport with fuel, servicing, and instrument capability for poor weather. However, the cargo ramp averaged only two available spots at any one time, and the team evaluated Las Americas as an emergency divert airfield, at best.\footnote{Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Shawn C. Underwood, 621 CRW, 8 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Jeffrey K. Fallesen, 817 GMRS, 7 Apr 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10.}
Contingency Response Group

The Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), led by the 817th Contingency Response Group (CRG), arrived at the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Toussaint Louverture International Airport on 14 January 2010. They arrived on five different aircraft loads, each referred to as a chalk. Led by Colonel Patrick R. “Hoot” Hollrah, the JTF-PO began integrating their operations with those of the Joint Assessment Team and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) units already in place. During a contingency deployment such as Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the 817 CRG handled everything from airfield management to aircraft loading. The Army’s 688th Rapid Port Opening Element (part of the JTF-PO) operated the cargo yard and its forward node, to disperse humanitarian aid to the non-governmental organizations. For the first week, the AFSOC combat controllers controlled the air traffic pattern, while the 817 CRG operated the ramp and airfield. Then, Air Force air traffic controllers arrived and took over the air traffic pattern.35

On their way to Port-au-Prince, the 817 CRG’s personnel planned how they expected operations to go. However, as soon as the doors opened, they realized their planning was not going to work. In just one example, the 817 CRG was sized and deployed with enough manpower to operate a location with a working maximum on ground (MOG) of two aircraft. The 13-man maintenance package expected to work on a ramp with up to 4 aircraft at one time. They had planned to work two aircraft, allowing those aircraft to leave and two more to come in, while they worked the next two aircraft. When they arrived, they found the chaotic ramp and realized they would actually have to run the ramp. The AFSOC combat controllers were doing a great job of landing the aircraft as quickly as they could, but once those aircraft turned onto the single taxiway, the combat controllers focused on the next aircraft landing or taking off. The aircraft on the taxiway proceeded to the parking ramp with little or no oversight. First Lieutenant Anthony M. Brown, the maintenance officer, and Master Sergeant Dale W. Tyler,

the maintenance production superintendent, re-evaluated the situation.\textsuperscript{36} As Sergeant Tyler put it:

\begin{quote}
The best decision we came up with was the sacrifice one of our crew chiefs and put him with the combat controllers to sit out there with them. Even though it takes another crew chief off of the flightline and makes it harder for us, that was vital to our operations, because, then, they [the combat controllers and maintainers] could talk to each other. We would actually have communication with them. Whenever they would try and bring an airplane in, we could override them and say, “No, I can’t fit that in there.”\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Although reluctant at first to have the crew chief assist in the process, the combat controllers agreed to give it a try. Within a day, this logistical approach easily doubled the number of aircraft transiting the airfield. It also allowed the maintainers and aerial porters to split their small teams (already divided into day and night shifts) into two parts, each manning half of the parking ramp, while the shift leader worked back and forth as required. Again, while not optimal, this provided the most efficient way to offload the aircraft, given the limited manpower available. Their mission was further hampered by the very limited vehicles and forklifts at the ramp. Additionally, many of the foreign and commercial aircraft had to be offloaded by hand because of the way they were loaded or the incompatible equipment. The crew chief with the combat controller also had to be mindful of the various types of aircraft that were landing, e.g., how much space the wingtip clearance required, which could conduct a powered back up, which had towbars available, which carried their own towbars.\textsuperscript{38}

At about the same time, the 817 CRG’s airfield manager, Captain Donovan S. Davis, began negotiating operations with the Haitian airfield authorities. In fact, he spent his first two days in Haiti developing a personal relationship with the Haitians, which proved vital to the success of the mission. Based largely on the recommendation of the Haitian airfield managers, Jean-Max Bellerive, Prime Minister of Haiti, temporarily turned over responsibility for the airfield to


\textsuperscript{37}Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with MSgt Dale W. Tyler, 817 GMS, 7 Apr 10.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with 1st Lt Anthony M. Brown, 817 GMS, 7 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with 1st Lt Ryan S. Fisher, 817 GMS, 7 Apr 10.
Captain Davis and his airfield management team. Later, General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Commander, noted that Captain Davis provided just one example of how partnership building can enhance operations. He noted that when he talked with the airport’s Haitian authorities, they spoke highly of Captain Davis, saying he was welcome to return to Haiti any time and even stay in their homes. Because of his personal effort to build relationships with the airfield managers and other key Haitians at the Port-au-Prince airport, Captain Davis ensured AMC operations went smoother, sooner than might have occurred otherwise. In the end, humanitarian aid and medical assistance flowed faster and probably saved thousands of additional lives.\(^{39}\)

Even after gaining that authority, Captain Davis and his team continued to network with the Haitians, even helping them regain control of their airport. Airfield safety had become a great concern—people were wandering around the airfield, across taxiways and parking ramps. The international news media had set up in front of the defunct control tower and in the unused radar facility. Slowly, but surely, and in coordination with the security forces and local Haitian authorities, Captain Davis’ team and the 817 CRG gained control of the taxiways and parking ramps. Set pedestrian and vehicle paths, control points, and established times helped to reduce the risks. The 817 CRG also, politely, but firmly, pushed the media and other non-operational functions away from the control tower, ramps, and radar facilities. This was not an attempt to stop access as needed by these organizations, but to control the airport the way any other international airport would be managed.\(^{40}\)

Along with safety, security presented challenges for the 817 CRG. As already noted, the 817 CRG was designed to handle a MOG of two aircraft. Generally, this required a small security force. However, the large, complex operations at Port-au-Prince, combined with the perimeter and other damage caused by the earthquake, meant the initial force of 26 personnel was too small. In 2 shifts of 13 personnel each, they set up a layered defense—random perimeter and area patrols and entry control on the ramp. Security forces accompanying AMC aircraft, known as Phoenix Ravens, provided the last line of defense. In at least two cases,

\(^{39}\)Briefing (U), Capt Donovan Davis, 819 GSS, [Phoenix Rally brief], 29 Mar 10; Briefing Slides (U), Capt Donovan Davis, 819 GSS, [Phoenix Rally photos], 29 Mar 10; Article (U), TSgt Parker Gyokeres, 621 CRW/PA, “CRW Captain Sees Haiti Scene Unfold from Under the Brim of Many Hats,” USAF Aim Points, 22 Mar 10; Disc (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Gen Raymond E. Johns, Jr., AMC/CC, 10 Aug 10.

\(^{40}\)Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Capt Donovan S. Davis, 819 GSS, 7 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with 1st Lt Ryan S. Fisher, 817 GMS, 7 Apr 10; Rpt (U), JTF-PO/CC, “After Action Report, USTRANSCOM Joint Task Force-Port Opening--APOD, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE,” 19 Mar 10.
Phoenix Ravens stopped unauthorized access to AMC aircraft. However, given the manifest problems (discussed in the “Managing the Mobility Air Forces” section) during the operation’s early days, it was not too surprising that three “stowaways” arrived at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, on 20 January. Other incidents, or near-incidents, also occurred because of the lack of security, falsified documents, people with the same name but different visa numbers, and babies wrapped in blankets that were not counted in the make-shift passenger manifests. To help alleviate this, the Air Force deployed the 820th Security Forces Group (SFG), from Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, in response to the 817 CRG’s request for forces (RFF). The first portion of the 820 SFG arrived on 24 January and began to make an immediate impact. By 26 January, General Millmann, the Director of Mobility Forces at the 612th Air and Space Operations Center, reported that within the previous 24 hours, the security forces had stopped 47 attempts to access the airport and that the situation was improving daily. The remainder of the 820 SFG arrived on 27 January. This new force worked the airfield perimeter and passenger terminal, which allowed the 817 CRG’s security forces to focus on controlling the ramp.

The 817 CRG placed a few other RFFs, as needed, for additional manpower--primarily air traffic controllers to replace the AFSOC team. Early on, the 817 CRG and Federal Aviation Administration requested a portable airfield tower, which required a contracted AN-124 to deliver. It took the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center some time to arrange the delivery, but the tower arrived on 21 January. It took five hours to unload--they did it using the built-in crane aboard the AN-124 and without closing down the runway. Of additional note, rumors continued to circulate that the 817 CRG was putting in RFFs for runway assessment and repair teams. However, the JTF-PO did not have any concerns or difficulty with the runway.

The vast majority of the RFFs that went forward were to support US Southern Command’s 24th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG), the group that would take over airfield operations. The 24 AEG’s advance (ADVON) team arrived on

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18 January. The team arrived without tents or plans for office space, and with limited communications capability. The JTF-PO bedded them down and provided assistance to get them up and running. The ADVON team began initiating RFFs to build their group. However, these requests were not well coordinated. The group had grown to approximately 100 personnel before tents and other equipment began to arrive for them. Finally, on 7 February, the 24 AEG moved into their own tents, relieving some of the burden on the JTF-PO. By then, another issue had arisen: how much 817 CRG equipment should be left behind? The 817 CRG’s leadership wanted to return all of its equipment to McGuire, but higher headquarters directed the group to leave behind two Alaskan shelters, with generators and electrical units, and all of its material handling equipment. This drained the group’s resources and delayed its reconstitution and availability for future taskings.43

The 24 AEG successfully took over airport operations, relieving the JTF-PO in mid-February. The final elements of the 817 CRG departed on 20 February. During its 37 days in Haiti, the JTF-PO’s 217 personnel handled 3,006 aircraft, offloading 15,450 short tons of cargo and onloading 15,495 passengers (see Table 1). Of the 3,006 aircraft, approximately 44 percent were US commercial carriers, 38 percent international, and 18 percent US military.44

Likewise, by mid-February, operations were winding down in the Dominican Republic. AMC’s leadership decided to close operations at Maria Montez International airport in Barahona, and the 123 CRE relocated to San Isidro Air Base, Dominican Republic, on 8 February. This allowed the active-duty 615 CRE to redeploy back to Travis Air Force Base to reconstitute. The 123 CRE continued to manage operations at San Isidro until it was released on 25 January (completing its redeployment on 1 March).45 Whether operating airfields in Haiti or the Dominican Republic, the primary focus remained on moving aircraft with cargo and passengers. For AMC, that principally meant airlift via C-17s and C-130s.


44Slides (U), USTRANSCOM JTF-PO, “Joint Task Force Port Opening, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti,” ca 14 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Col Patrick R. Hollrah, 817 CRG/CC, 7 Apr 10.

TABLE 1
JOINT TASK FORCE-PORT OPENING MISSION DATA SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-17</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>566</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Commercial</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>2,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,006</td>
<td>6,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Evacuation Missions | 301 Litter Patients, 10 Ambulatory
Passengers Offloaded    | 9,509
Cargo Offloaded         | 15,450 short tons
Passengers Onloaded     | 15,495
Cargo Onloaded          | 253 short tons

Airlift (U)

On the afternoon of 12 January 2010, Major General Brooks L. Bash, Director of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Directorate of Operations, and his deputy, Brigadier General Bradley R. Pray, received notification that a major earthquake struck the Caribbean nation of Haiti near the capital city of Port-au-Prince and started lining up resources for a probable humanitarian relief mission. General Bash, who had served as the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) during the 2004 Indonesian tsunami relief operation, estimated the initial flow of supplies and aid would probably take place over the following weekend, allowing for a 48- to 72-hour period of initial damage assessment and analysis of requirements.46

According to General Pray, proper assessment played a key role in determining the most effective response, taking into account AMC’s continuing participation in two ongoing combat operations:

The USSOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] deputy commander [Lieutenant General P. K. “Ken” Keen, US Army] was down in Haiti at the time. He immediately began making assessments and calls back to USSOUTHCOM with what kind of requirements would initially [be needed]. So, it was those kinds of communication links that were being formulated at USSOUTHCOM up to USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] to give us a head’s up for what kinds of footprints we would need to be moving down.47

General Bash noted that in times of crisis AMC continued to operate business as normal, with adjustments to handle the new situation as required. It came down to focusing the Command’s energies on an important new tasking, such as the pending Haitian earthquake humanitarian relief mission, “Because you only have so much capacity, which we’re pretty much maxing out all the time.”48

Concurrently, the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) staff--relying on previous experience--started putting airlift crews into aircrew rest. At 0640

46Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, p 1.

47Ibid.

48Ibid, p 2.
Zulu\textsuperscript{49} (0040 Central Standard Time, Tuesday morning, 13 January), the 618 TACC activated a contingency response group for a Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) deployment to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. At 1530 Zulu, AMC issued prepare-to-deploy orders to aeromedical forces, sourced a Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF), and directed the MASF to prepare for deployment. Two C-17 aircrews and two C-130 aircrews went into Bravo Alert at 1600 Zulu, while planners started evaluating Haiti’s airfields for suitability for large-scale airlift operations.\textsuperscript{50}

On 13 January, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order for a Haitian relief operation, which directed AMC to assign a Director of Mobility Forces at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH). The USTRANSCOM execute order followed on 14 January. It directed, in part:

> Provide deployment and distribution capabilities to the affected area as quickly and safely as possible in order to mitigate human suffering and loss of life due to the effect of the earthquake in Haiti...quickly deploy USTRANSCOM-unique multi-modal distribution capabilities, extensive C2 [command control], and total asset visibility systems to meet the needs of USSOUTHCOM and other key HA/DR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief] stakeholders.\textsuperscript{51}

On Thursday, 14 January, USSOUTHCOM issued its execute order for what was now termed Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Authorized by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, it tasked USSOUTHCOM with executing foreign disaster relief operations in association with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the US Department of State. US Transportation Command received orders to coordinate and monitor strategic lift assets (i.e., air and surface), provide air and surface mobility planners to the USSOUTHCOM Deployment and Distribution

\textsuperscript{49}Zulu” time is the military/aviation term for Greenwich Mean Time.

\textsuperscript{50}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, pp 1-2; AFI 11-2C-17V3, AMC/A37V, Flying Operations: C-17 Operations Procedures, 21 Dec 06, para 3.13. BRAVO Alert aircraft and aircrews maintain a 3-hour launch requirement; CHARLIE Alert aircrews must be ready to enter crew rest within 2 hours and are then legal for alert 12 hours after entering crew rest. A third category, ALFHA Alert, postures aircraft and aircrews for launch within one hour of notification.

\textsuperscript{51}EXORD (U), USTRANSCOM/CC, “USTRANSCOM Execution Order (EXORD) for Support to Haitian Earthquake Relief Operations, EXORD 10-02 (Jan 10),” 14 Jan 10.
Center, and, at least initially, use Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, as the primary aerial port of embarkation. In addition, USTRANSCOM was to deploy sustainment supplies; deploy or provide joint assessment teams to Haiti; and deploy the Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), contingency response groups, and contingency response elements to Haiti and to US locations as necessary. United States Southern Command was the supported command; USTRANSCOM was one of a number of supporting commands.52

Through 13 and into 14 January, Air Mobility Command and its operational arm, Eighteenth Air Force, worked to get personnel and aircraft lined up in advance of formal tasking. At the command and control level, this included the selection of Brigadier General Robert K. Millmann, Jr., who was the mobilization assistant to the Eighteenth Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, as AMC’s DIRMOBFOR at the 612th Air and Space Operations Center. Colonel Daniel R. Miller, Commander, 615th Contingency Operations Support Group, at Travis Air Force Base, California, was assigned as General Millmann’s deputy.53

Additionally, AMC started assigning augmentation personnel to various locations, including the air and space operations centers (AOCs) at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, and First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. The lead personnel started arriving on Friday, 15 January, with others reporting through the weekend.54

Upon arrival at the AOCs, AMC personnel immediately joined with the centers’ small, full-time staffs and started working the issues. While AMC provided the airlift for Haitian relief, it also functioned as a supporting command to United States Southern Command—hence, the assignment to AFSOUTH’s 612 AOC at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Personnel assigned to that AOC worked closely with their counterparts at the 618 TACC back at Scott. As noted by Mr. Kelly Sherwin, systems analyst and long-range scheduler with the 612 AOC and a member of the center’s air mobility directorate, the first initiative involved getting flight personnel into crew rest.55

52EXORD (FOUO), USSOUTHCOM/CC, “CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) EXORD (U),” 16 Jan 10, info used is not FOUO.

53Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 1-2.

54Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 1-2; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Bradford T. Johnson, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 1-2.

55Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Kelly Sherwin, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 1-2.
Sherwin described their initial efforts as “...more of a knee-jerk reaction kind of immediate tasking: move this, move that.” However, he added, this was not atypical of a disaster response like an earthquake or hurricane. As he put it:

You can’t predict it; it just happens. It’s a pickup game for the first few days, really. What do you need to get in? And, the first thing in any disaster--not only an earthquake, but a hurricane--what is the status and condition of the field? Luckily, we had some people on the ground. General Keen was there. In fact, his aide was killed when the Hotel Montana collapsed. He had been in the Hotel Montana; General Keen himself, I think, was hurt, injured in the earthquake. That was just chance that he happened to be on scene. Once the magnitude of the disaster was evident, I think you saw everything start ginning up in Washington, at USTRANSCOM, AMC, TACC, USSOUTHCOM, and USAID [US Agency for International Development]. A lot of organizations started coming together.56

First Into Haiti

On 13 January 2010, KC-135Rs, and not airlifters, flew the first Air Mobility Command (AMC) mission in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Hurlburt Field, Florida, dispatched the Air Force’s initial disaster response team to Port-au-Prince, Haiti—a special tactics team, which included tactical air traffic controllers, led by the commander of the 1st Special Operations Group.57

AMC KC-135Rs refueled the AFSOC MC-130s that were headed to Haiti from Hurlburt Field on 13 January. In order to airlift the heavy loads required for the mission, the special operations C-130s had to take off with a reduced fuel load. Following an inflight refueling, the AFSOC aircraft had enough fuel to get to Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti, offload, and return to the Florida panhandle.58

56Ibid.

57Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, p 3; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 2; Article (U), Associated Press, “US plans massive military response for Haiti,” 13 Jan 10; Article (U), Michael M. Phillips, “US Team Directs Traffic in Crowded Skies,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 Jan 10.

58Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 2; Article (U), Staff Sgt J. Paul Croxon, “Fueling Relief,” Airman, Jun 10.
Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport sustained substantial damage, and on 13 January, Haitian aviation authorities closed it to all commercial aircraft. With the tower damaged and unable to function due to a lack of electrical power, AFSOC personnel began providing air traffic control and ground support at the airfield using portable—and improvised—facilities. On the airfield, dozens of aircraft, some damaged, some without fuel, cluttered what little available space existed.59

By the morning of Thursday, 14 January, workload and taskings at the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) reached the level where the commander, Major General Mark S. Solo, decided to activate the Command’s Contingency Response Cell. At 1100 local, the TACC put eight additional C-17 aircrews on Bravo alert and three in Charlie alert and put four C-130s in Bravo and two in Charlie. General Solo judged that postured the Command well for follow-on taskings.60

At 1325 on 14 January, the first Air Mobility Command aircraft actually landed at Port-au-Prince. A 21st Airlift Squadron (assigned to the 60th Air Mobility Wing) C-17A from Travis Air Force Base, California, delivered the California Task Force 2 Urban Search and Rescue Team. The Team, which was loaded at March Air Reserve Base, California, was requested by the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance.61

On 16 January, a 62d Airlift Wing C-17A delivered New York’s Urban Search and Rescue Team, New York Task Force 1. The 4th Airlift Squadron aircrew—Captain Rick Kind, aircraft commander; Captain Lindsey Jackson, copilot; First Lieutenant Beau Suder; Technical Sergeant Mark Hafer; Staff Sergeant Joseph “JD” Ruiz, loadmaster; and Senior Airman Robert Gallagher—took the scenic route in order to deliver their payload to the stricken nation of Haiti.62 The aircrew had received this new tasking from the 618 TACC while returning to McChord Air Force Base, Washington, following a channel mission from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. According to Captain Kind, the flight home marked the conclusion of

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60Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 2.


62Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Capt Rick Kind, Capt Lindsey Jackson, 1st Lt Beau Suder, TSgt Mark Hafer, SSgt Joseph Ruiz, and SrA Robert Gallagher, 4 AS, 18 Mar 10, p 1.
a 10-day stage mission in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but when they received the call, while over the mid-Atlantic, they knew exactly what was coming next--new orders directing the aircrew to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, for crew rest and a replacement aircraft, followed by a flight to Stewart International Airport, Newburgh, New York, to pick up the New York’s Urban Search and Rescue Task Force 1. After loading 26 personnel, 82,000 pounds of cargo, and 3 search and rescue dogs, the aircrew departed Stewart International Airport for Port-au-Prince. They arrived at 1513 local on Saturday, 16 January. Captain Kind observed:

On the way down, there was a whole lot of traffic coming in from the United States, and as we got closer to Haitian airspace, we expected to hold for an hour and a half. We knew the airfield was tight and airspace congested. But, we hit our holding fix and right after that were cleared for approach and landing. As we came down, we saw a US Navy aircraft carrier just off the coastline, a lot of helicopters, and, of course, a lot of other traffic. There was civilian traffic everywhere. Coming in, we could also see some of the devastation, hundreds of collapsed buildings, hundreds of people in the streets, tents everywhere, quite surreal. We landed at Port-au-Prince airport; AFSOC controlled the field at the time...They parked us, no kidding, as close as they could to the airplane next to us--it was actually kind of scary. In fact, we parked about 10 feet in front of every single media outlet that was there and were afraid we’d blow them around. As we taxied in, we saw hundreds of people waiting in line to get out of Haiti.

For the flight out, the 4th Airlift Squadron aircrew floor-loaded 186 evacuees, including men, women, and children--some elderly and at least two people with serious injuries. They flew directly to Sanford-Orlando International Airport, Florida, marking the first AMC C-17 Haitian relief mission into that airport. Upon landing, they turned over their charges to personnel from the Transportation Security Administration and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement. A church group and other volunteer organizations greeted the passengers with food, blankets, and supplies. Air Force Emergency Planning Liaison Officers,

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64Ibid, p 2.

65Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Capt Rick Kind, Capt Lindsey Jackson, 1st Lt Beau Suder, TSgt Mark Hafer, SSgt Joseph Ruiz, and SrA Robert Gallagher, 4 AS, 18 Mar 10.
directed by First Air Force (Air Forces Northern), Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, coordinated the interagency support activities at Sanford-Orlando International Airport and several other relief airfields.\textsuperscript{66}

For the 4th Airlift Squadron aircrew, the mission, while long and convoluted, left a lasting personal impact. According to Staff Sergeant Ruiz:

\begin{quotation}
...the people were getting off the plane. The look on their faces, the thanks they were giving us, shaking hands, hugging us. I didn't realize how much we'd impacted their lives until I saw how relieved they were to be out of there. As the loadmaster, I was the one strapping them down, and I was worried about getting people quickly strapped down and out of there. It wasn't until we landed that I realized how important the whole mission was and the impact it had.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quotation}

Managing Air Traffic

Simultaneously, with the initial delivery of search and rescue teams and humanitarian supplies and the initial return of evacuees and the injured to US airports, Air Mobility Command (AMC) moved assessment teams into Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti. The reports from the assessment teams determined the size and composition of the follow-on-forces.\textsuperscript{68}

Conditions at Port-au-Prince’s airport were hectic, with aircraft flying in from all points of the compass. On the positive side, by 15 January 2010—barely three days after the earthquake and the Toussaint Louverture airport’s initial closure—Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH) rated the airfield as “secure and operational 24/7,” capable of handling about 90 relief aircraft a day

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Rod Simmons, Director, National Security Emergency Planning Agency, Continental US NORAD Region, 30 Mar 10, pp 4-5; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Joe Sanders, Chief, Defense Support to Civil Authorities Cell, Continental US NORAD Region, 31 Mar 10, p 3.
\item Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Capt Rick Kind, Capt Lindsey Jackson, 1st Lt Beau Suder, TSgt Mark Hafer, SSgt Joseph Ruiz, and SrA Robert Gallagher, 4 AS, 18 Mar 10, p 3.
\item Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 2-3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
under the direction of the 601st Air and Space Operation Center’s Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida.\textsuperscript{69}

With more planes coming in on a daily basis, developing, assigning, and controlling slot times for the incoming aircraft constituted one of the single biggest challenges. “Slot times” determined the arrival time of each aircraft, the maximum time it could stay on the ground in Haiti, and its departure time. This raised issues, partly the result of the large number of relief flights attempting to get into Toussaint Louverture airport and partly due to the airfield’s physical constraints. Prior to the earthquake, the airport handled about 25 flights per day on its single runway. Following the earthquake, Air Force Special Operations Command combat controllers quickly established positive approach and terminal control; however, long-term requirements mandated the quick and effective implementation of an effective slot system.\textsuperscript{70}

According to Mr. Kelly Sherwin, assigned to the 612th Air and Space Operations Center, the situation was “…like Larry, Curly, and Moe all trying to get through the door at the same time. When the disaster happens…they [the relief agencies] all head that way.” He noted Port-au-Prince’s airfield limitations included a single runway, as well as limits on parking space, aircraft, material handling equipment, and all-but-non-existent personnel support facilities. Workspace on the small ramp was very tightly constrained.\textsuperscript{71}

As a result, the HFOCC, under the direction of Colonel Warren H. Hurst, the Director of Mobility Forces at the 601st Air and Space Operations Center, implemented slot times--i.e., scheduled landing, on-ground-time, and departure “windows”--for all aircraft operating into Haiti. The use of slot times required an agreement by the Haitian government to let the US military coordinate all airspace operations and scheduling into and out of the country, “…a concession of national sovereignty in a lot of respects,” according to Mr. Sherwin.

If you did not have slot times, it would be unmanageable chaos on Port-au-Prince…in fact, even with slot times, a lot of aircraft were diverted away because they didn’t conform to the protocols. I think it created some international hardship. I think the French came in and said, “You denied us our slot time and diverted us.” The Brazilians were

\textsuperscript{69}Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “15/2300Z to 16/2359Z Jan 10 12 AF (AFSOUTH) Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 16 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Capt Rick Kind, Capt Lindsey Jackson, 1st Lt Beau Suder, TSgt Mark Hafer, SSgt Joseph Ruiz, and SrA Robert Gallagher, 4 AS, 18 Mar 10, pp 1-2.

\textsuperscript{70}Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10, pp 2, 8; Article (U), Staff Sgt J. Paul Croxon, “No Tower in Sight,” Airman, Jun 10.

\textsuperscript{71}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Kelly Sherwin, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 4-5.
coming off the continent with big airplanes, and they were in holding. It was the only way to rein in the chaos that otherwise would’ve gone on at that field. You just had to invoke it. Maybe it’s not pretty, but it’s just as effective; it works. Somebody has to grab the iron and make the decisions to control what’s happening, and that’s a very effective way to do it.\textsuperscript{72}

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Seeker, Commander of the 317th Operations Support Squadron, was the officer in charge of the stage operations at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. He noted that occasionally poor communications resulted in confusion over slot times. In discussing C-130 operations from Pope, he said:

When you need three and a half hours to get down there, you can’t call us two hours in advance of the slot time and say ‘we’ve changed it.’ That happened. We had crews already in the air; they’d land; and they’d get in trouble, ‘Hey, this isn’t your slot time.’ It was frustrating.\textsuperscript{73}

According to Colonel Daniel R. Miller, who was the AMC Deputy Director of Mobility Forces at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH), the large number of militaries, nations, and agencies involved—including AFSOUTH, First Air Force (Air Forces Northern), the Federal Aviation Administration, the World Food Program (representing the United Nations), the US Agency for International Development (which was the lead for State Department efforts)—resulted in communications and coordination issues. Other problems resulted from the large number of aircraft trying to get into and out of the island of Hispaniola, which also included a substantial number from the US Navy, US Marine Corps, Canadian forces, and other nations’ helicopters, many of them operating from ships.\textsuperscript{74}

How crowded were the skies over Haiti and its portion of the Caribbean? By 19 January—one week after the earthquake—AFSOUTH reported an ability to schedule 126 sorties through Port-au-Prince per day, up from 90 just four days previously. Slots for wide-body aircraft, such as C-17As, DC-10s, and Boeing 747s, were already allocated through 10 February, while narrow-body aircraft were booked solid through 23 January. Navigation aids for the Toussaint Louverture

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, p 5.

\textsuperscript{73}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Thomas W. Seeker, 317 OSS/CC, 17 Aug 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel Dagher, 317 AG/CC, 18 Aug 10.

\textsuperscript{74}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, p 6.
airport received temporary certification, allowing flight operations in poor weather conditions down to a 500-foot ceiling and 7,200-foot visibility.75

The skies over Port-au-Prince resembled an “aluminum overcast.” US Navy aircraft included P-3C Orions, operating from MacDill Air Force Base and Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida; MH-53Es from Naval Air Station Guantanamo, Cuba; E-2C Hawkeyes; C-2A Greyhounds; the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson with 6 MH-53Es, 4 MH-60s, 5 SH-60Fs, and 4 HH-60Hs (the latter specifically designed and equipped for combat search and rescue duties); USS Normandy, with 2 SH-60Bs; and USS Underwood, with 2 SH-60Bs.76

Other aircraft included a Federal Aviation Administration Beechcraft 200 King Air, operating from Lidar in the Dominican Republic; PC-12s flying from Rafael Hernandez Airport, Aguadilla, Puerto Rico; and a single DHC-8-202 shuttling between Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, and Port-au-Prince. US Army personnel operated UH-60As from San Isidro Air Base, Dominican Republic, plus RQ-7B remotely piloted vehicles. The US Coast Guard provided HH-65s, HH-60s, UH-25s, and RU-38As, along with the new HC-144 Ocean Sentry patrol aircraft flying from Puerto Rico, and Coast Guard Air Stations Clearwater and Miami, Florida. The US Customs and Border Protection aircrews flew one DHC-8 and two UH-60s.77

Most of the ships involved in the relief operation—which included five ships with two US Marine expeditionary units and multiple US Coast Guard cutters—also operated their own integrated aviation capability. Other nations that contributed naval assistance—again, with their own integrated aviation capability—included the Canadian ships HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Halifax, each operating a single CH-124. Needless to say, things got hectic.78

Many of the other nations involved brought some form of transportation for their equipment and personnel. Belgium provided a medical team, search and rescue team, and a water purification system. China sent a 50-member rescue team to join the 125 military personnel already in Haiti as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Cuba sent 30 doctors and medical supplies; Israel, a survey team; Iran, 30 tons of humanitarian aid; and Russia, a mobile hospital and a staff of 45, including 20 doctors. The United Nations World Food

75Rpt (U), AFSOUTH “19/0000Z to 19/2359Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 19 Jan 10.


Programme provided 86 metric tons of food. Other aid came from organizations such as the United Nations’ World Health Organization, International Rescue Committee, Inter-American Development Bank, and Salvation Army.79

As the volume of materials directed to Toussaint Louverture International Airport increased, the issues of slot times and downloading of supplies continued to dominate command and control efforts.80 The initial priority was getting in food, water, and medical supplies, although, not surprisingly, other materials showed up. According to Colonel John R. Romero, Chief of the Air Mobility Division at AFSOUTH, individual organizations constantly called and requested slot times for their aircraft.

Our initial concern was, I think, organizations thought their cargo was the number one priority; everyone thought they were the number one priority. Everyone had the good intentions of Haiti at heart, but not everybody could be number one. We had to kind of manage a flow. We never turned anyone away from a slot; we didn’t necessarily give them the one they wanted. But everyone always got a slot time.81

Lieutenant General Glenn F. Spears, Commander, Twelfth Air Force and AFSOUTH, compared the situation at the Port-au-Prince airport to a “…virtual baseball catcher with ‘pitchers throwing balls from all directions all at the same time.’” The Director of Mobility Forces at the 612th Air and Space Operations Center, Brigadier General Robert K. Millmann, Jr., called the situation at Port-au-Prince a “madhouse,” stating, “We saw a situation that was untenable, like stuffing five pounds of sand into a three-pound stack.”82

Slot times remained an issue throughout Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, although, eventually, as the operation shifted from emergency relief to sustainment, things settled a bit. The early portion demonstrated classic best of intentions, although the massive influx of aircraft periodically dragged the airfield down to “…the unmanageable disaster of chaos,” with aircraft from all over the world coming into Toussaint Louverture International Airport. Official visitors to the

79Ibid, pp 29-30; Brfg (FOUO), Patrick M. Schraufnagel, AMC/A2A, “Background Paper on Haiti,” 15 Jan 10, pp 5-6, info used is not FOUO.

80Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 5-6.

81Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 4.

82Article (U), Martha Mendoza, “Haiti flight logs detail early chaos,” Air Force Times, 19 Feb 10.
operation—usually arriving in their own nation’s aircraft—included Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; former President William Jefferson Clinton; President of Ecuador Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado; President of the Dominican Republic Lionel Fernandez Reyna; Republic of Korean Operations Director Major General Hak-Joo Kim; Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander of the US Fleet Forces Command; and retired US Army General Wesley K. Clark.83

The airfield even saw periodic appearances by well-known private citizens. Major General Brooks L. Bash, Director of the AMC Directorate of Operations, commented, “You know, you’ve got all these NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and aircraft from all over the world trying to go in there. Traffic’s getting backed up. You’ve got actors flying their airplanes in there with a thousand pounds of stuff, taking up ramp space, shaking hands. Other planes can’t get in there because they’re sitting there.”84

Despite the hectic circumstances, within approximately 72 hours of the earthquake, Air Mobility Command flew 19 missions into Port-au-Prince. Over the first 10 days of the operation, the Command moved over 12 million pounds of relief supplies. According to Major General Mark S. Solo, commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, Air Mobility Command “...hit the ground running and did a great job.”85

Opening Additional Airfields

On 20 January 2010, Haiti sustained a particularly violent aftershock, registering 6.0 on the Richter scale. Fortunately, the temblor didn’t cause additional damage at Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport.


84Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, p 4. In a highly publicized move, actor John Travolta flew his personal Boeing 707-138B into Port-au-Prince with approximately 1,000 pounds of relief supplies. The aircraft was formerly owned by Quantas Airlines and Braniff International and was the last flying B-707-138 in the world. Mr. Travolta acquired the aircraft, carrying its historic Quantas markings, in 1998.

85Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 3.
in Haiti and didn’t disrupt the proceedings. However, aftershocks remained a serious threat to the airport, as well as to Port-au-Prince’s few port facilities, which were already heavily damaged, and to aid distribution efforts. Any closure of Port-au-Prince’s airport constituted an international disaster, as Colonel John R. Romero, Chief of the Air Mobility Division at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH), noted:

Port-au-Prince was the center of gravity. If we had another earthquake, and the runway was damaged, or if a plane crashed on the runway, there was no way to get aircraft into Port-au-Prince. That was the single point of failure.86

Opening additional airfields in the vicinity of Haiti provided a solution to the problem. However, Haiti was an island with limited infrastructure, and Port-au-Prince’s international airport, for all of its design constraints and damage, constituted the only viable, large-jet-capable airfield in Haiti. Air Mobility Command (AMC) assessment teams looked at other possible facilities in Haiti, including Port-de-Paiz/Cap Haitien, on the island’s north coast, as well as Jacmel, located to the southwest of Port-au-Prince. Ultimately, neither proved suitable or satisfactory for US Air Force relief operations, although the Canadian Air Force—with a long history of working with Haiti—opened up Jacmel. As summarized by Canadian Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, and C-130 pilot, David Kennedy:

[Jacmel] had a small field that was suitable for C-130 operations... minimally. At a reduced landing weight and according to a few people I’ve talked to, it was a bit of a sporty adventure early on. I know that both the Air Force--US Air Force--and the US Marines took a look and said, “Mmmm, no, not going there.” That’s kind of the region that we were geared to go into and support.87

The Canadian operation was directed by the Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command and used existing facilities in Kingston, Jamaica—in association with the Organization of American States and the Jamaican Defense Forces—to operate their portion of the relief effort, which included three CC-130 Hercules aircraft staged from Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Ontario. The very first Canadian

86Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 5.

87Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Kelly Sherwin, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 3-4; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, Lt Col David Kennedy, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 2; Msg (U), Capt Michael A. Khosrovani, AMC/A4TC, to AMC/CAT All Personnel, “Hot!!! Add-on Airfield, MTCH--Update for Airfield Assessments for Today’s Haiti Ops Brief,” 16 Jan 10.
relief flight delivered elements of an International Strategic Support Team, a Humanitarian Assistance Relief Team, and a Mobile Medical Team; eventually, the Canadian Air Force provided up to six C-130 humanitarian flights daily into Jacmel.88

However, the Canadians also operated the CC-177 Globemaster III and, thus, faced the same issue as AMC planners: what alternate airfields could handle deliveries with the big jets if some problem arose at Port-au-Prince? Fortunately, the answer was right across the border, in the Dominican Republic.89

AMC’s initial evaluation of two airfields in the Dominican Republic—Barahona/Maria Montez International Airport to the south and San Isidro Air Base at the northwest tip of the island—proved them somewhat suitable. Generally, Montez was the better of the two airfields because of its runway length and location, but the government of the Dominican Republic didn’t immediately make it available. San Isidro Air Base, therefore, was used first, although it wasn’t suitable for C-17 operations due to runway and ramp weight restrictions. As a result, the airfield primarily handled C-130s.90

According to the assessment team, other operational shortcomings at San Isidro Air Base included an inoperative navigation aid, unlit taxiways with vegetation encroaching on the runways, and a lack of a ground refueling capability.91

Maria Montez International Airport also had severe operational constraints. Similar to Toussaint Louverture International Airport, it had a single runway and a single, mid-field taxiway. After landing, aircraft executed a 180-degree turn in order to taxi down the runway to the terminal. The Maria Montez airport could handle aircraft up to the size of a C-5, but didn’t operate them due to the limited

88Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, Lt Col David Kennedy, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 4; Rpt (U), USNORTHCOM, “Haiti Earthquake 2010,” 3 Mar 10, 2; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “17/0000Z to 17/2359Z Jan 10 12 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 17 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “20/0000Z to 20/2359Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 20 Jan 10.

89Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, Lt Col David Kennedy, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 2, 4; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 5; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10, p 7. The Canadian Air Force acquired four C-17As during 2007-2008 for intertheater airlift missions and assigned the designator CC-177 to the aircraft. Number 429 (Transport) Squadron operated the CC-177s from Canadian Forces Base, Trenton, Ontario.

90Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 5; Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10, p 7-8.

turn space, “...a restriction we lived with,” according to Mr. Kelly Sherwin, who was assigned to the 612th Air and Space Operations Center.92

San Isidro Air Base provided somewhat more flexibility than Maria Montez airport, with multiple taxiways and parking spots on the ramp; however, both airfields suffered from a lack of cargo and aircraft handling and support equipment. Despite its condition, by the end of January, San Isidro operated 24 hours a day with an aircraft maximum-on-ground of two. Maria Montez remained restricted to day-only operations through the duration of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE and never served as a refueling point for transient aircraft.93

Eventually, the Kentucky Air National Guard’s 123d Contingency Response Group, which wasn’t fully manned and operational at the time it received the call, provided a contingency response element (CRE) to relieve the assessment team at Maria Montez International Airport. The group added communications, command and control capability, and also provided the necessary equipment and vehicles to load and unload cargo, including a 10,000-pound forklift. The CRE commander, Lieutenant Colonel David Mounkes, proudly stated, “This is a mission we’re well equipped to perform, and it’s one that we take very seriously.”94

In order to open up the two Dominican Republic airports, the Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH) foreign policy advisor, Ambassador Paul Trivelli, and his US Southern Command counterpart, Mr. Alland D. Langland, worked with the military attaches in the Dominican Republic and that nation’s government. They set up a ground-haul contract to get the supplies over the mountains into Haiti, employing the Crowley Maritime Corporation of Jacksonville, Florida. The combination of the two additional airfields and truck transport enabled the use of C-17s to bring more security forces and outsize cargo directly to Port-au-Prince.95


93Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Kelly Sherwin, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, p 4; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “30/1200Z to 30/2356Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 30 Jan 10.

94Article (U), Maj Dale Greer, “123rd supporting earthquake relief in Haiti,” 123 AW/PA, 1 Feb 10.

95Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 8, 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 26 Jan 10, p 11. Toward the end of January, a Joint Assessment Team also evaluated Las Americas Airport at Punta Caucedo near Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, but Joint Task Force-Haiti decided against opening Las Americas.
While Air Mobility Command’s heavyweight aircraft, the C-5, didn’t fly into any of the airfields on the Hispaniola island, it served admirably while operating from other airfields. C-5s flew into Naval Air Station Guantanamo Bay with large loads, which were then trans-loaded to vessels for the trip to Port-au-Prince. When absolutely necessary, AMC relied on leased Antonov An-124s to bring oversized loads directly into Port-au-Prince, including a mobile air traffic control tower. The temporary tower arrived at Toussaint LOuverture International Airport on 21 January, went into operation with Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controllers the next day, and added Haitian and US Air Force air traffic control personnel by the 30th. Seven Royal Australian Air Force controllers joined the tower crew on 7 February.96

Major General Mark S. Solo, commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, recalled:

Yes, we did not get any C-5s into Port-au-Prince. It was a decision early-on that although the runway was long enough, and you had a ramp, the throats to the taxiway were not wide enough for the C-5 to be able to turn off. We were able to employ the C-5 to do some other things. A C-5 moved some ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets from Nellis [Air Force Base, Nevada] into Puerto Rico. We also used the C-5 to haul a Mexican field kitchen from Mexico City to Jacksonville, Florida, where it was loaded on a ship and sealifted to Haiti.97

96Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “30/1200Z to 30/2359Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 30 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “04/0000Z to 04/2359Z Feb 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 4 Feb 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “23/0000Z to 23/1159Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 23 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “24/1200Z to 24/2359Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 23 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “26/1200Z to 26/2359Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 26 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “01/0000Z to 01/2359Z Feb 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 1 Feb 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 19 Jan 10, pp 1, 2, 4; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 6; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 20-21.

The C-5 missions into Puerto Rico that Major General Solo mentioned included the delivery of six 432d Wing RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and their support personnel and equipment from Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. Initially, planning called for the emplacement of the full-motion-video-capable UAVs at US Coast Guard Air Station Borinquen, at the northwestern tip of Puerto Rico, although operations subsequently shifted to Roosevelt Roads, at the island nation’s east end. The first of the RQ-1s and its team arrived on 23 January, and the first reconnaissance/aerial video imagery missions began on the 27th.\(^98\)

As for airfields in the US, the establishment of staging airfields or primary operating locations for the C-130s and C-17s dominated much of the early planning and effort. Logically, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and Air National Guard C-130s flew from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, under the auspices of the host unit, the 43d Airlift Wing. Due to the expected high level of operations at the base, in addition to the 68 personnel assigned to the 43d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, the 43d Airlift Wing received augmentation from several units, including 53 additional aerial port personnel from the 53d and 80th Aerial Port Squadrons.\(^99\)

As part of the process, the 317th Airlift Group at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, received orders to establish a C-130 stage operation at Pope to augment the 43d Airlift Wing. The 317th Airlift Group commander, Colonel Daniel “Dags” Dagher, initially dispatched a team under the direction of the Group’s Director of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Blaine L. Rochlitz. However, as the enormity of the ground operation set in, Colonel Dagher sent in the commander of the 317th Operations Support Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Seeker, to assume responsibility for the stage operations at Pope because of his extensive operations support background.\(^100\)


\(^99\)Rpt (FOUO), “Operation Unified Response,” 43 AW/HO, ca Apr 10, p 1, info used is not FOUO.

\(^100\)Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Thomas W. Seeker, 317 OSS/CC, 17 Aug 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel Dagher, 317 AG/CC, 18 Aug 10.
In retrospect, Lieutenant Colonel Seeker considered the title of “stage operations” a misnomer, as, more accurately, he and his personnel handled aircrew scheduling at Pope Air Force Base, initially for the 317th Airlift Group aircrews. Once he and his staff determined the situation at Pope, Colonel Seeker recommended sending additional personnel to take charge of “stage” activities, including a small tactics cell, a crew scheduler, an officer, and a senior enlisted person “to deal with a first-sergeant-type of focus.”

The initial 317th Airlift Group contingent subsequently handled scheduling for all aircrews who staged through the base, while other Group personnel supported the aerial port functions. Colonel Dagher didn’t call the situation at Pope “a perfect storm,” but said it was close, with a lot of aircraft—as he put it—“falling out of the sky.”

Senior Master Sergeant Jarrod D. Sebastian, Loadmaster Superintendent for the 40th Airlift Squadron, recalled 37 aircraft and 33 aircrews on the ground at one point. The first C-17A mission to depart Pope left the airfield with 6 pallets of cargo and 53 passengers just before noon on 14 January. Roughly 12 hours later, the first C-130 mission departed with 6 personnel from Air Force Special Operations Command’s 21st Special Tactics Squadron, plus their vehicles. In total, the stage operation cycled 126 aircraft through Pope, including C/MC/EC-130s from 16 Air Force active-duty, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard wings; C-17As from 9 wings and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center; and airliners from 7 different commercial carriers.

Personnel from the 43d Airlift Wing, 317th Airlift Group, and other aerial port personnel continued to move the proverbial mountains, made the operation work, and eventually supported the aircrew activities for all C-130s and C-17s that transited Pope. The 317th provided eight aircraft loaded with its personnel and equipment. Colonel Dagher, commenting on the preparations that made the stage/scheduling operation work, said “Had we not gone, it might have taken another three or four days before AMC could have gotten the manning out there to do the right staging job.”

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101 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Thomas W. Seeker, 317 OSS/CC, 17 Aug 10.

102 Ibid; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel Dagher, 317 AG/CC, 18 Aug 10.


104 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Thomas W. Seeker, 317 OSS/CC, 17 Aug 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel Dagher, 317 AG/CC, 18 Aug 10.
Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, which—other than during the airlift of elements of the US Army’s 82d Airborne Division—served as the primary C-17A base and was fully manned and operational throughout Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, but it, too, sustained periodic difficulties. By 22 January, barely a week into the operation, its ramp filled with the host wing’s C-17s and with visiting aircraft. Colonel John M. Wood, Commander of the 437th Airlift Wing, issued a “yellow alert” to the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, which indicated there were no remaining “normal” C-17 parking spots on the base. The colonel advised the wing maintain eight contingency parking spots on an as-needed basis, and, if all else failed, the commercial side of the airfield—Charleston International Airport—could house a few aircraft on a temporary basis.\textsuperscript{105}

Despite the crowded circumstances, Colonel Wood delivered an overall highly positive report on the situation at the large installation:

> Our assessment is this is working well. We’re calling aircrew issues solidly “Green.” Maintenance and port are doing great as well. Full ramp brings logistical challenges...we have not yet [gone] to 12-hour shifts—that’s my trigger to switch to solid yellow, as that would pose a long-term sustainment challenge. Indoor storage is getting full. We have lots of non-perishables stacked outside. Overall, “Green/Yellow.” All support functions from the 628th [Air Base Wing] are excellent...LRS [logistics readiness squadron] is keeping the mission moving, and they’ve worked magic in billeting on base, vehicles, extended hours for Shopette, and dining facility.\textsuperscript{106}

In Florida, Homestead Air Reserve Base, south of Miami, quickly assumed prominence. Home of the 482d Fighter Wing, under Brigadier General William B. Binger, it also served as a US Agency for International Development supply point. However, it, too, had constraints. While Homestead previously hosted bombers under Strategic Air Command and, thus, had a very long runway, the devastation wrought by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 resulted in its transfer to the Air Force Reserve Command, with minimal support facilities. According to Colonel Daniel R. Miller, Deputy Director of Mobility Forces at Twelfth Air Force


(AFSOUTH), as a fighter base, it lacked aerial port capabilities, but, fortunately, the Air Force Reserve Command agreed to contribute contingency response personnel, dispatching a team led Lieutenant Colonel Mark F. Visco, Commander of the 512th Airlift Control Flight at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. Finding volunteers in the Air Force Reserve Command to assist with establishing operations at Homestead didn’t prove a problem. Brigadier General Randy A. Kee, Vice Commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, recalled:

Folks were literally running to the sound of gunfire, if you will, if I can use that old historic term. A lot of folks wanted to help. We had a lot of folks who wanted to volunteer and donate lots of goods. In fact, within the first couple of days, a large portion of donated supplies were coming into Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida. They were certainly not equipped to handle that...we worked with A3 [Operations] at Air Force Reserve Command at Warner Robins, but also with Major General [Charles E., Jr.] Reed [Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air Force Reserve Command] to help source material and people to go down to Homestead to help them dig out of the goodness of onslaught that had hit at their base.

Homestead also served as an early return point for American citizens and other evacuees from Haiti, who were airlifted on C-130s on a non-interference, non-reimbursable basis. Colonel John R. Romero, Chief of the Air Mobility Division at AFSOUTH, stated the early guidance was “if they looked American, they sounded American, load them up on a plane...take them out.” Eventually, C-130s served as the primary aircraft for getting evacuees into Miami International Airport, with C-17s airlifting American citizens into Charleston Air Force Base, on a non-interference basis.

At Homestead, General Binger brought in US Customs and Border Protection officers and billeted them on base. According to Colonel Miller at AFSOUTH, “From the first time we dropped AmCits [American citizens] in there on General Binger, it was difficult, but he successfully executed.” By 16 January, Homestead


109Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 5-6.
had 45 trucks waiting with pallets of water, meals-ready-to-eat, and medical supplies, about 12 pallets per truck. Working with AMC’s contingency response personnel, the Air Force Reserve Command personnel efficiently moved supplies and enabled a maximum-on-ground of four aircraft.\textsuperscript{110}

The success of the Homestead operation didn’t mitigate a need for additional airfields in Florida for the reception of evacuees. After discussions with the US State Department, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services, Air Mobility Command personnel established operations at Miami International Airport and Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport. As at Orlando-Sanford International Airport, which first received Haitian refugees on 16 January, each new processing site required support personnel, fueling services, personnel processing services, and some sort of military presence to coordinate.\textsuperscript{111}

That’s when the Air Force Reserve Command called to active duty all of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) under the direction of First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. According to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Sanders, Chief of the Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Directorate (AFNSEP) at Tyndall, one Air Force EPLO went to the Florida State Emergency Operations Center to handle the flight-following mission and coordination, while other EPLOs went to Sanford, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale to coordinate the activities of federal, state, and local authorities, as well as fire and emergency medical services.\textsuperscript{112}

One EPLO, Colonel Lincoln E. Larson—a Delta Airlines pilot—went from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, to Orlando-Sanford. In an article, he summarized the reception process, which started with a launch report with information on the type of aircraft, arrival time, the number of American citizens on board, the number of non-American citizens, and whether any of the passengers were injured or required special assistance. As an EPLO, he then coordinated with emergency services, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Customs and Border Protection, and other supporting agencies. Colonel Larson summarized his duties as “…a very rewarding job. It is very different from a typical military job.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, p 7.

\textsuperscript{111}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Joe Sanders, Chief, Defense Support to Civil Authorities Cell, Continental US NORAD Region, 31 Mar 10, p 7.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113}Article (U), Gary Taylor, “Military’s go-to guy, Air Force Col. Lincoln Larson, is at home at Sanford airport coordinating Operation Safe Return,” Orlando Sentinel, 30 Jan 10.
Unfortunately, as with other components of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, occasionally communications broke down, or the word didn’t get to the liaison and support personnel in south Florida. Rod Simmons, director of AFNSEP, recalled that the EPLOs didn’t always receive correct information on the numbers of inbound injured or on their planned delivery point. This periodically resulted in situations where the EPLO at one airfield summoned ambulances and emergency services personnel, but the aircraft wound up elsewhere. “I wish I could say we got that right towards the end,” Simmons commented, “but even towards the end, we were actually—I guess—struggling with that issue. We had the folks with the DIRMOBFOR [Director of Mobility Forces] over in the AOC [air and space operations center], and we had the folks from AMC, and we had the folks from USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] all talking, but it just never quite came together.”

Simmons specifically noted one of the “events,” which resulted in the diversion of an inbound C-130 from Fort Lauderdale to Miami at the behest of former US Senator John R. Edwards, who was traveling with a group of orphans.

Here we’ve got Fort Lauderdale, all of those ambulances lined up—we’ve got pictures of those ambulances lined up—and they’re here in Miami. But, nothing bad, nobody died, nobody got hurt. It was just one of those things where we could not get the information we really needed. I guess we could have done that better, when you talk about the Haiti incident.

**Aircraft Availability**

With the United States involved in two major wars--Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM--finding enough C-17s to support Haitian relief operations quickly became problematic. Brigadier General Randy A. Kee, Vice

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115Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Joe Sanders, Chief, Defense Support to Civil Authorities Cell, Continental US NORAD Region, 31 Mar 10, p 7; Rpt (U), USNORTHCOM, “Haiti Earthquake 2010,” 3 Mar 10, p 10. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Port-au-Prince via an 89th Airlift Wing C-32A on 16 Jan 10 for a humanitarian supply delivery and meeting with the president of Haiti, Réne Préval (Brfg (U), US Department of State, “Remarks to the Press, Port-au-Prince, Haiti--Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,” 16 Jan 10).

Commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, recalled “after getting an early sense, we said, ‘No, we’re going to need more C-17s than this.’”

Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) Operations Directorate training office immediately started working with the Air Education and Training Command to borrow C-17As from the Globemaster III schoolhouse at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, which was operated by the 97th Air Mobility Wing. Concurrently, the AMC training office and the Operations Directorate leadership worked with Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to gain C-17s from the 3d Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and the 15th Air Mobility Wing at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. Major General Brooks L. Bash, AMC Director of Operations, referred to the Haiti operation as “just a little blip on the scope” in comparison to the Command’s daily airlift requirements, but noted that borrowing aircraft still exacted a price. He stated:

> What made it hard is we continued to do everything else. Normally, it’s zero sum, but in this case we didn’t make it zero sum, we made it additive. That’s why we went to Altus and PACAF, so that we could actually increase capacity. And [we] paid the bill for that with volunteerism and loss of training...not just at Altus, but all the bases where we pulled the training fences.

Major General Mark S. Solo, 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center Commander, stated that General Duncan J. McNabb, Commander, US Transportation Command, fully supported the effort, notifying the AMC Operations Directorate that “…if we need those PACAF assets, all he has to do is ask for them.” General Solo added:

> That’s a key doctrinal thing to keep in mind, that although they’re PACAF assets, owned and operated by them, if we need them for a national crisis, General McNabb can call for them, and, in this case, we did. And, of course, General [Gary L.] North [Commander, Pacific Air Forces] was very forthcoming and said, “Yes, you’ve got ‘em.”

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118 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, pp 11-12.

119 Ibid.

120 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 7.
Aircraft Security

When Air Mobility Command aircrews and aircraft travel to foreign airfields, specially trained security forces personnel of the Phoenix Raven program go along to provide force protection expertise and airfield assessments. However, early in the Haitian relief operation, a question arose about the actual need for Phoenix Raven personnel onboard AMC’s transport aircraft. According to Brigadier General Bradley R. Pray, Deputy Director of AMC Operations Directorate, “No one really understood what the [security] issue would be, because some of the special tactics units had some security.” Major General Brooks L. Bash, Director of the AMC Operations Directorate, added:

...[you had] people congregating around the field, because that’s where the water, food, and transportation were. With an abundance of caution, you go in with security to keep control. It’s really almost from the safety perspective, because you can’t have people running around airfields. But also, the concern for looting and that sort of thing, with people being unruly. Those situations can turn pretty quickly.

AMC Commander General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., ended the debate quickly, noting the Phoenix Raven teams were specifically trained to provide aircraft and aircrew security at foreign airfields. On 14 January 2010, the AMC Judge Advocate signed off on the rules of engagement covering the employment of Ravens on the flights to Haiti and the return flights to the United States. All Air Mobility Command aircraft employed in the operation received a “mission essential” declaration; thus, Ravens held authorization to defend the aircraft by force, up to and including deadly force. The Ravens were also provided guidance on the protection of Haitian nationals and non-Department of Defense persons and temporary detention of unauthorized personnel on the ramp or near the aircraft.

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121Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan 10, p 1.

122Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, p 5.

The Phoenix Raven Cell, assigned to the AMC Installations and Mission Support Directorate’s Security Forces Branch, started scheduling personnel from AMC bases, including security forces personnel who received “Just-in-Time” training as Fly-Away Security augmentees. As the number of flights increased, the “Just-in-Time” personnel proved invaluable. As Phoenix Raven Program Manager Master Sergeant Gary T. Bubar put it afterwards:

…if we tried to do this with the Ravens themselves, there’s no way we would have survived. Because of the chaos down at Port-au-Prince, there was really no unity of effort at that time. It boiled down to…it was almost a free-for-all as far as when AmCits and Haitian nationals were being evacuated from Port-au-Prince, and they were going back to Florida. When they got to the aircraft, although the aircraft commander and the Ravens were there to kind of monitor what was going on, we didn’t really have the final say on who was getting on board. That was more of a Department of State and other agencies on the ground in Port-au-Prince--it was more their responsibility to do that piece. That was a big obstacle for our guys. Once the airfield circulation improved, we didn’t have that problem anymore.124

During the course of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, other security issues arose. Throughout the operation, the Phoenix Ravens never received authorization for personnel searches, as that was supposed to take place before the evacuees actually boarded the outbound aircraft; unfortunately, with all of the confusion in Port-au-Prince, the Raven teams couldn’t count on verification of the searches. Also, they were not allowed to take weapons off the aircraft and were expected to maintain a discreet presence during the unloading and loading. “We’re the invisible presence,” as Raven Technical Sergeant Douglas C. Hodgson put it. As a result, some Haitians made unauthorized flights to the United States, but US Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers immediately detained them. No issues with weapons arose during the flights.125

The single biggest issue was caused by aircraft scheduling, a component of the constant changing of slot times. The Phoenix Raven Cell at Headquarters Air Mobility Command, at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, quickly set up their own 24-hours/7-days-a-week scheduling operation, using the three personnel in the

124Intvw (FOUO), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with MSgt Gary T. Bubar, MSgt David E. Frederick, and TSgt Douglas C. Hodgson, AMC/A7SOC-Ravens, 26 Mar 10, pp 2-3, info used is not FOUO.

125Ibid, pp 3, 4, 13, info used is not FOUO; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 20 Jan 10, p 3.
office: Master Sergeant Bubar, Deputy Program Manager Master Sergeant David E. Frederick, Jr., and Scheduler Technical Sergeant Hodgson. The Raven Cell also set up a Raven-specific staging operation, starting at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, and followed by stages at MacDill Air Force Base and Homestead Air Reserve Base, both in Florida. Sergeant Frederick recalled that aircraft didn’t necessarily return to the airfield they initially launched from, which forced the Raven schedulers to shuttle personnel around by whatever means available: commercial air, rental car, or by military vehicle.126

At the peak of operations, the Raven “command team” had 320 people flying here, there, and everywhere, constantly monitored by a single individual at Scott Air Force Base. They even pulled instructor personnel from the Phoenix Raven training course at the United States Air Force Expeditionary Center and also used Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard personnel, when possible.127

While all contributed and served in an exemplary manner, proven by no in-flight incidents during the operation, Sergeant Frederick said the Ravens at Charleston and Pope excelled:

Pope had guys on standby. Literally, it was almost like a ball boy at a tennis match. They were ready to run out to the aircraft...as soon as we got a mission drop, hey, engines are running, they would help out. Charleston, same thing with the C-17s. We’d get a little bit more notice, sometimes an hour, but the flexibility that all the cops displayed during this entire thing was phenomenal...that was the mission, and everybody knew it was the mission. It was pretty cool to see everybody pulling together to get the job done.128

Fortunately, the few security incidents that took place at Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti were quickly resolved. On 19 January 2010, three Haitian stowaways managed to get onto a C-130 at Toussaint Louverture airport and made it to Pope Air Force Base. US Customs and Immigration Enforcement officers immediately took the individuals into

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126Intvw (FOUO), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with MSgt Gary T. Bubar, MSgt David E. Frederick, and TSgt Douglas C. Hodgson, AMC/A7SOC-Ravens, 26 Mar 10, pp 5, 6, info used is not FOUO.

127Ibid, pp 6, 11-12, info used is not FOUO.

128Ibid, p 5, info used is not FOUO.
custody. Over 21 and 22 January, the airfield sustained two security breaches involving unauthorized personnel on the ramp, which required the use of mace to subdue the trespassers. On 25 January, security forces at the airport apprehended 47 Haitians who attempted to get to the aircraft in groups of 2 and 3; however, AMC’s Director of Mobility Forces at the 612th Air and Space Operations Center, Brigadier General Robert K. Millmann, Jr., noted this was a downward trend, and security at the airport was “improving daily.” Finally, on 28 January, Ravens grabbed four Haitians in the act of attempting to board a C-17A and turned them over to the Haitian National Police.\textsuperscript{129}

Moving the 82d Airborne Division

On 14 January 2010, to more fully manage the security situation in and around Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to deploy the 82d Airborne Division’s ready brigade, the 2d Brigade. The official purpose for the deployment was to aid in the distribution of relief supplies, while providing security for that distribution.\textsuperscript{130}

The movement constituted a substantial upgrade from initial plans, which involved sending only one company from the ready brigade, designated the “Global Response Force” or GRF. While the commander of the 43d Airlift Wing, Colonel James C. Johnson, received a verbal warning order in preparation for the airlift on 13 January, the new orders required the expanded deployment of more than 2,000 personnel, plus their vehicles, support equipment, and supplies, commencing with the airlift of the brigade advance echelon at 1655 local on the 14th.\textsuperscript{131}

The requirement for movement of the 2d Brigade quickly expanded into a second phase, and nearly required a third phase, of C-17 operations. Major General Brooks L. Bash, Air Mobility Command (AMC)

\textsuperscript{129}Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “22/0000Z to 22/1159Z Jan 10 AFSOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 22 Jan 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 20 Jan 10, pp 3, 9, 12.

\textsuperscript{130}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, p 7; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 3.

\textsuperscript{131}Rpt (U), USNORTHCOM, “Haiti Earthquake 2010,” 3 Mar 10, 3; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 20 Jan 10, p 2; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, p 3; Rpt (FOUO), “Operation Unified Response,” 43AW/HO, ca Apr 10, p 2, info used is not FOUO.
Director of Operations, termed the airlift as a “fast moving train...it seemed like they were load planning as planes were showing up.”

Within a couple of days of the initiation of the brigade move, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, made it clear this particular airlift effort constituted his number one priority. Brigadier General Randy A. Kee, Vice Commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, recalled:

That was a mountain of stuff...that became, for us, the number one priority. We still had only so many slots per day. The long story short is that we had to wedge priorities, but focus primarily on the number one priority when it came to the 82d Airborne [Division], not that everything else shut down, but everything else then became secondary. We filled in as best we could because, obviously, we had airplanes coming from multiple stations. It was a balancing act giving the priority to the priority, but it wasn’t to the exclusion—it was to the priority.

Two other situations quickly arose. The quickest way to get the 82d’s 2d Brigade to Port-au-Prince was through all three operating airfields on the island of Hispaniola: Maria Montez International Airport in Barahona and San Isidro Air Base, both in the Dominican Republic, and Toussaint Louverture in Haiti. However, the government of the Dominican Republic expressed immediate concern about the image of armed Americans in full combat gear traveling through their countryside. As a result, the entire brigade flew into Toussaint Louverture International Airport. According to Colonel Daniel R. Miller, who was the AMC Deputy Director of Mobility Forces at Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern):

You’ve got the 82d Airborne [Division] that’s going in with guns. I mean, they’re postured to provide that security piece. We limit the “Dom” [Dominican Republic] to just that cargo, so you wouldn’t have somebody in the “Dom” get off a flight and then all of a sudden drive through downtown Santo Domingo like it’s an invasion force.

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132Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 20 Jan 10, p 2; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col John R. Romero, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 4-5.

133Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO, with Brig Gen Randy A. Kee, 618 TACC/CV, 21 Apr 10, p 14.

134Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 20 Jan 10, p 2; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 8-9.
In addition, the massive passage of C-17s through Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, effectively shut down the C-130 humanitarian relief operations at the base for a period of three days. Still, from the time of the Chairman’s notification through the completion of the brigade move, only 108 hours elapsed, and Air Mobility Command moved 2,000 soldiers and 805 of their vehicles. It required 97 C-17-equivalent loads, 117 missions total: 77 with C-17As and 40 with C-130s. Lieutenant General Frank G. Helmick, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, declared the deployment “closed” at midnight on 22 January. In the words of Major General Mark S. Solo, the commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, the short-fuse airlift constituted the “fastest move since Vietnam” of a combat brigade.\textsuperscript{135}

### Aerial Delivery

Early during the Haitian relief Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, planners at both the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) and Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH) considered possible airdrops of relief supplies outside of Port-au-Prince. According to Mr. Kelly Sherwin, assigned to AFSOUTH's 612th Air and Space Operations Center, the 618 TACC leadership didn’t think such airdrops would take place--because of concentration on the collection and distribution effort in Port-au-Prince proper--but AFSOUTH already held information on drop zones surveyed for the 1994 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and thought that information might come in handy.\textsuperscript{136}

The initial concept of operations called for a second, and possibly a third, distribution point outside of Port-au-Prince for the resupply effort. It set as a baseline four C-130s per drop--or two C-17As, if the Globemasters were available. It also assumed the ground commander of forces would have enough personnel

\textsuperscript{135}Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 21 Jan 10, p 4; Rpt (FOUO), “Operation Unified Response,” 43AW/HO, ca Apr 10, p 2, info used is not FOUO; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Lt Col Thomas W. Seeker, 317 OSS/CC, 17 Aug 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, pp 4-5.

\textsuperscript{136}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Kelly Sherwin, 612 AOC, 17 Feb 10, pp 2-3. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began in September 1994 with the deployment of a US-led multinational force to restore the government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide and restore order in the country. The operation officially ended on 31 March 1995, when the United Nations Mission in Haiti assumed responsibility for peacekeeping operations within the country.
and material handling equipment to secure the drop zones, receive the airdropped supplies, and control distribution.\textsuperscript{137}

Airdrop aircraft were planned to stage from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, due to the immediate availability of supplies and rigging capacity. The size of the drop zones determined the number of bundles dropped per pass, which concurrently affected the loiter time of the aircraft before they had to return for fuel—particularly for the C-130s, which did not have the range to fly from Pope to Haiti and all the way back to North Carolina. The use of 4 C-130s on each mission resulted in a requirement for 20 airdrops, taking about 15 days to complete. Planners noted they could cut the time in half if a closer airfield such as Key West, Florida, or San Juan, Puerto Rico, served as a forward operations site, with C-17s delivering fully rigged and ready bundles for trans-loading to the C-130s. If the planners could use only C-17s for the airdrops, total delivery time dropped to four days.\textsuperscript{138}

The critical concern was that the airdrop deliveries could inflict damage—-injuries or fatalities--on the Haitians or local structures. This also led to a debate over the proper terminology of the mission, i.e., “airdrop.” According to Colonel Daniel R. Miller, who was the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Deputy Director of Mobility Forces at AFSOUTH, the airdrop term had a connotation that sounded like the United States was invading (a few of the Caribbean and South American nations, including Cuba and Venezuela, already referred to US relief efforts as a “Yankee invasion” of Haiti).\textsuperscript{139}

Major General Brooks L. Bash, AMC Director of Operations, recalled that the debate over terminology and national image was frustrating and got in the way of the mission:

There were some sensitivities to the word “drop” versus “aerial delivery,” interesting twist—so now you have the strategic communications aspect of all this. “Airdrop” is very enticing; “Well, let’s drop food!” Well, you’ve got to worry about dropping food on people, have to secure a drop zone, [and the] Army doesn’t have a lot of people to do that. Then, the capacity of airdrop; we talked about...a two-ship airdrop feeds 40,000 people for 24 hours. Well, they had a million people down there! So, it was very...“point relief” is what we called it. We couldn’t do a lot of it because we couldn’t secure the drop zones.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{137}Brfg (U), AMC/A3D, “Haiti Humanitarian Airdrops Draft CONOPS,” ca 14 Jan 10.

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, p 12.
Concerns about “strategic communications” and a perception—real or otherwise—that the United States was failing in getting relief supplies to Haiti hampered the mission. These concerns directly led to several interviews by Major General Bash with major American media outlets. As he noted afterwards:

Before we showed up, they were taking 20 planes per day in there—now, we’re doing 120 because of our US military. Our US military is securing the distribution points for the food, so there isn’t the hoarding; there isn’t the rioting and all those sorts of things. Because of the international community, you’ve got Cuba, you’ve got Venezuela, you’ve got some of these other countries that are flying in there and are saying the US is just trying to take over the country. Because Haiti had given us the ability over the airspace and the airport, they’re using that against us in strategic communications.\textsuperscript{141}

Initial planning for the aerial deliveries called for a proof-of-concept mission, with a single C-17 delivering Container Delivery System bundles of food and water; due to a limited number of Humanitarian Daily Rations, AMC anticipated dropping standard Meals Ready-to-Eat. Survey personnel identified a suitable drop zone for the initial test, which was designated as Davis Drop Zone and was located approximately five miles northeast of Port-au-Prince’s airport. Pending the successful outcome of the test, AFSOUTH intended to posture eight-each C-130s and C-17As for aerial deliveries.\textsuperscript{142}

However, when all was said and done, only four aerial delivery missions took place: two by C-17s and two by C-130s. 437th Airlift Wing personnel flew the first two missions, while the 317th Airlift Group’s 39th and 40th Airlift Squadrons’ aircrews flew the C-130 missions. The C-17A proof-of-concept mission took place on 18 January 2010 and successfully delivered 14,000 Meals Ready-to-Eat and 14,000 liters of water on Davis Drop Zone, “on target, on time,” with no injuries or incidents. A second mission, on 21 January, delivered an identical load of food and water at Mirabalais Drop Zone, 23 miles northeast of Tousaint Louverture International Airport, followed by two (and, as it turned out, final) missions on

\textsuperscript{140}Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10, p 8.

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142}Rpt (U), AFSOUTH DIRMOBFOR, “17 Jan 10 SITREP 0001Z-2359Z,” 17 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AFSOUTH, “17/0000Z to 16/2359Z Jan 10 12 AF (AFSOUTH) Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 17 Jan 10.
23 January to Tinsley and Church Drop Zones, located four miles north and six miles east of Port-au-Prince, respectively.\footnote{Rpt (U), 317 OSS, “Haiti Relief Data Tracker,” 27 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AF SOUTH, “18/0000Z to 18/2359Z Jan 10 AF SOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 18 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AF SOUTH, “22/000Z to 22/1159Z Jan 10 AF SOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 22 Jan 10; Rpt (U), AF SOUTH, “23/0000Z to 23/1159Z Jan 10 AF SOUTH Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE SITREP,” 23 Jan 10; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 21 Jan 10, pp 4, 7; Article (U), “Airdrop delivers critical supplies to earthquake victims,” Armed Forces News Service, 18 Jan 10.}

Captain Samuel A. “Sam” Sterlin, from the 39th Airlift Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, flew the second C-130 aerial delivery. Notably, his was the first aircraft and aircrew to depart Dyess for Pope, immediately following the “go forth” order from Headquarters AMC. As he recalled, the delivery went as advertised--albeit flown at night with the aircrew using night-vision goggles--and they had to make two passes after one group of bundles failed to go out the back end of their aircraft. He termed the flight and the relief operation as a “once in a career” experience.\footnote{Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Capt Samuel A. Sterlin, 39 AS/OSO, 17 Aug 10.}

Among AMC personnel--from the top down--the aerial deliveries proved highly successful, but concluded after only four missions. AF SOUTH received a report--from a Marine Expeditionary Unit that worked ground operations in the vicinity of one of the drop zones--that indicated local Haitian authorities held very strong concerns about possible injuries resulting from aerial deliveries. According to Colonel Miller, “...it really wasn’t what Joint Task Force-Haiti and the Haitians agreed should happen. They were reluctant to continue with that [the deliveries], so we put it on hold.”\footnote{Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AF SOUTH Deputy DIRM OB FOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 22-23.}

**Transition to Sustainment**

At the end of January 2010, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) released its updated estimates for the death and destruction sustained by Haiti since the catastrophic earthquake on the 12th of January: 112,392 deaths; 700,000 people displaced in the immediate vicinity of Port-au-Prince; and approximately 3 million Haitians affected in one form or another by the earthquake. USAID and Department of Defense humanitarian funding totaled a staggering $425,523,748; individual agency contributions included those by Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Peace Corps, Samaritan’s Purse,
Save the Children, the World Health Organization, and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc., known as CARE.146

Supplies and personnel continued to arrive in Haiti via Air Mobility Command (AMC), contract, non-governmental organization, and other-nation airlift, including items such as back-up generators, tents, medical supplies, and donations from corporations such as WalMart. The relief operations involved 3,220 flight hours.147

Increasingly, however, many of the materials and supplies moved to Jacksonville, Florida, for sealift into Port-au-Prince’s repaired port facility. While the airlift of relief supplies into Haiti required much of AMC’s focus, the Command also remained dedicated to supporting the mission’s medical requirements, as well as the airlift evacuation of American citizens, critically injured Haitians, and orphans from Haiti.148

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146Fact Sheet (U), USAID, “Haiti-Earthquake,” Fact Sheet No. 20, 1 Feb 10, pp 1, 3.

147Rpt (U), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Movement-January 2010,” 3 Sep 10; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jan 2010 to 31 Jan 2010,” 8 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; E-Mail (U), Kelly V. Sherwin, 612 AOC/AMD, to Brig Gen Robert K. Millman, 612 AOC/AMD et al, “1 Feb 1500Z TRANSCOM/SOUTHCOM DCO session notes,” 1 Feb 10. For a month-by-month breakdown of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE airlift, see appendices 2 and 3.

On 16 January 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Jon Thorpe and Major Todd Moore, assigned to the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, monitor the status of air mobility missions supporting relief efforts in Haiti, from the 618 TACC’s Contingency Response Cell (CRC). The 618 TACC’s CRC, comprised of mission planners, managers, and command-and-control personnel, was specifically dedicated to Air Mobility Command’s involvement in Haiti relief operations, enabling other 618 TACC personnel to continue planning missions to support other US worldwide operations, including support of Operations IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM. (US Air Force photo/Capt Justin Brockhoff)
Members of the 621st Contingency Response Wing set up a hardside expandable light air-mobile shelter (HELAMS) at the Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti on 17 January 2010. The HELAMS served as the unit’s headquarters while deployed to Haiti and had satellite communications and other capabilities crucial to the wing’s mission at the airfield. (US Air Force photo/SSgt Danielle Johnson)
A US Air Force C-17 Globemaster from the 3d Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, lifts off from the runway in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, after delivering humanitarian supplies. (US Navy photo/MC2 Kristopher Wilson)
On 22 January 2010, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and active-duty Airmen load cargo on a C-130 Hercules at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida. The C-130 was assigned to the 35th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron. The cargo, consisting of bottled water, medical supplies, and other needed items, was loaded for delivery to military forces in the Dominican Republic assisting with the earthquake relief in Haiti. (US Air Force Photo/MSgt Stan Coleman)
A Federal Aviation Administration mobile air traffic control tower is being loaded onto a Russian Antonov An-124 aircraft at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, on 21 January 2010. The tower served as the main tower at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Air Force Reserve Command Airmen from the 914th Maintenance Squadron, Niagara Falls, New York, and the 73d Aerial Port Squadron, Carswell Air Reserve Station, Texas, assisted with the task. (US Air Force photo/MSgt Chance Babin)
A US Air Force C-17 Globemaster III from the 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, airdrops 14,000 bottles of water and 14,500 meals ready to eat/humanitarian rations to the outlying area of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 23 January 2010, to be distributed by members of the United Nations. The supplies parachuted into a landing zone coordinated by Kentucky Air National Guard Special Tactics operators. (US Air Force photo/TSgt James L. Harper, Jr.)
Airmen with the 6th Medical Group’s mobile aeromedical staging facility set up their tents after arriving at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 21 January 2010. The 13-member, self-sustaining team, comprised of nurses, medical technicians, and support staff, can set up and be ready to operate in less than three hours after arriving at a location. (US Air Force photo/T Sgt Bryan Gatewood)
Soldiers assigned to the 82d Airborne Division board a plane to return to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after completing a humanitarian assistance deployment supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. (US Navy photo/MCCS Spike Call)
C-17 Globemaster III aircraft from Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina; Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; McChord Air Force Base, Washington; and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, await missions to Haiti on the Joint Base Charleston flightline on 27 January 2010. Charleston served as the C-17 staging base for missions to Haiti. (USAF photo: SSgt Eric Harris)
Medical Operations on the Ground and in the Air

As with any natural disaster, there was a certain level of chaos, and early estimates of damage and loss of life could only be roughly calculated. For this reason, much of the mission preparation was based on initial unofficial reports coming into Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center from United States Special Operations Command personnel already on the ground in Haiti. These military personnel in Haiti approximated that there were 3,000 Americans in Haiti, who could possibly be injured. They also stated security was sketchy at best and recommended all forces deploy with 14 days of food and water.149

On 13 January 2010, less than one day after the earthquake struck Haiti, the aeromedical planning cell of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center began using what little information was available about the situation on the ground in Haiti to coordinate with AMC wing personnel to put crews on alert for potential missions to Haiti and requested from the AMC Command Surgeon’s office and AMC Operations Directorate that a mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) be placed under a prepare-to-deploy order. The MASF, designed as a self-sustaining field hospital, had a 13-person staff of medical technicians, nurses, and support staff. The staff provided specialized medical care to patients needing aeromedical evacuation.150

Of course, when the mobile aeromedical staging facility team and equipment would be airlifted to Haiti was based on a priority listing determined by United States Southern Command leadership. So, two days after the earthquake, the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center received guidance that placed medical flights to Haiti as fourth in the priority list--food and water was priority one. Aeromedical evacuation planners estimated a wait of roughly three more days before the MASF team would be moved with its equipment, unless leadership altered the priority list. Shortly after this priority guidance was received, the aeromedical evacuation schedulers within their cell of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center were notified that all C-17 aircraft being used in the relief efforts would be required for transport of the 82nd Airborne Army Division to Haiti. Schedulers knew that in all likelihood this would additionally slip the date the MASF could be transported.


Although attempts were made to include the mobile aeromedical staging facility package as part of other lift requirements, and efforts were made to acquire airlift for the MASF team and equipment using C-130s, neither of these strategies produced favorable results immediately. Eventually, however, the MASF team and equipment--from the 6th Medical Group, 6th Air Mobility Wing, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida--found transportation on a C-130, but not into Haiti. Instead, they flew from MacDill Air Force Base to the Dominican Republic, a sovereign nation that shares the small island with the country of Haiti. From there, the team headed for Haiti in a convoy, and, five and half hours later, on 20 January 2010, they arrived at the Port-au-Prince Toussaint Louventure International Airport in Haiti, where they immediately began negotiating for space to operate.

Once the airlift was finally executed and set-up at the airfield was accomplished, the mobile aeromedical staging facility team quickly adapted to the austere environment and went to work providing care for their sick and wounded patients and preparing them for transfer to aircraft for flight to the United States for further treatment. The team’s operations were not without challenges, such as relocation of sleeping quarters and the theft of resources, including food and water, the first two nights after the move. Also, during the early stages of the operation, the MASF team had to retrieve patients from as far away as 500 yards from its location. This additional effort limited the team’s capabilities and strained its productivity. Regardless of these challenges, medical personnel working at the mobile aeromedical staging facility still produced positive results--facilitating the transfer of 255 patients and 176 family members and medical attendants on 17 aeromedical evacuation missions in the first 24 days of medical operations. The 375th Air Mobility Wing deployed personnel to run the MASF and replaced the 6th Medical Group MASF team on 10 February 2010, as operations continued. By the first week of March, this MASF team also redeployed back to the United States, leaving behind only four personnel with limited equipment.

In addition to the mobile aeromedical staging facility deployment, the 6th Air Mobility Wing deployed an Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) team and equipment package to Port-au-Prince. This modular, scalable, rapid-response medical package, designed to provide medical care, including surgical,

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gynecological, and pediatric treatment capabilities, consisted of a staff of over 80 Airmen and a 20-bed hospital. The medical package represented the largest land-based Department of Defense medical facility in Haiti. The EMEDS team had four missions to accomplish:

- Support the US Navy Ship *Comfort* by assisting with patient movement to and from the ship
- Supply emergency medical support to 100 Air Force and 700 Navy personnel co-located at Terminal Varruex, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
- Perform medical outreach to non-governmental organizations
- Support a Columbian Medical Team co-located at Terminal Varruex

Although conflicts concerning space availability within the limited working area in the multiple tents set up around the Haitian airport caused some initial friction, the EMEDS personnel and MASF personnel collaborated to ensure patients received life-saving care and stabilized patients as much as possible, dependent upon injuries, for movement. Medical doctors and surgeons from the EMEDS team and other medical volunteers on-site triaged patients prior to their arrival at the MASF location. Once the patients arrived at the MASF, this triaging process expedited care and preparation for airlift. Medical personnel assigned to AMC units accomplished the actual aeromedical airlift of over 290 of these patients to hospitals in the United States.

In addition to EMEDS and MASF teams on the ground in Haiti providing life-saving care and preparing patients for airlift to the United States for further treatment, Air Mobility Command employed Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATTs), which were staged at MacDill Air Force Base. These teams provided intensive care to patients while actually in an aircraft during flight. This highly specialized rapidly deployable asset consisted of three team members—a physician, physician's assistant, and corpsman.

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155The movement of 290 patients was as of May 2010.

a critical care nurse, and a respiratory technician--operating specifically designed portable critical care medical equipment that could turn virtually any mobility airframe into a flying intensive-care unit.

The Critical Care Air Transport Teams’ unique capabilities proved vital to the aeromedical evacuation mission, amidst the chaos of the earthquake aftermath. For example, one of the three-member teams from the 88th Medical Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and staged at MacDill Air Force Base, flew three missions in as many days in the very first few dedicated aeromedical evacuation missions. One of these three missions originally involved the care of two critical patients from Haiti. However, upon arrival at the Port-au-Prince Toussaint Louventure International Airport in Haiti, medical personnel on the ground had determined a third patient was critical and also needed immediate transport to a treatment facility in the United States for further life-saving care. Although three critical patients for a three-person team was the very definition of overload, the team supported the transport and provided the care in the air needed to sustain these patients.157

Fortunately, not all of the aeromedical missions needed CCATTs support, and, unfortunately, early in the initial aftermath of the earthquake, this specialty capability was not yet available. In fact, the first four aeromedical missions were actually flown on the “back-end” of other relief flights coming back out of Haiti. The first dedicated aeromedical evacuation mission did not actually take place until 23 January. About one week after the first dedicated aeromedical evacuation mission, these operations went to a steady state, with regularly scheduled flights occurring daily and CCATTs only requested for flights that required their specialized care. By the end of February, the necessity for these aeromedical evacuation missions eventually tapered off as well, and airlift flights of people to the United States needing additional medical intervention and care were only flown on an “as needed” basis.158 The flow of aeromedical evacuation missions accomplished in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE is shown in Table 2.

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157Article (U), 2nd Lt Anastasia Wasem, 6 AMW/PA, “AMC Continues Aeromedical Evacuation Relief in Haiti,” 25 Jan 10.

TABLE 2

OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE
AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION MISSION LIST

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<th>Litter</th>
<th>Ambulatory</th>
<th>Attendants</th>
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<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
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**TOTAL** | **254** | **28** | **236**

NOTE: Litter indicates patients whose injuries did not permit them to walk onto the aircraft and were, therefore, carried by medical personnel with the use of a litter. Ambulatory patients could walk onto the aircraft, although not necessarily unassisted. Attendants could be family or volunteers accompanying individual patients to provide additional care and comfort. Duplication of some dates is intentional. This indicates more than one mission on a given day.

Air Force medical personnel supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, be they MASF, EMEDS, or CCATT team members, came from units assigned all over the continental United States, including the 375th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; 45th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and 6th Medical Group, MacDill Air Force Base; 94th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia; 88th Medical Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center, United States Transportation Command, also located at Scott Air Force Base.\(^{159}\)

\(^{159}\)Article (U), AMC/PA, “Aeromedical Evacuation Brings Haiti Victims to America for Medical Care,” USAF News, 28 Jan 10.
Suspension and Resumption of Aeromedical Airlift to the United States

At the same time the Airmen at the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center were scheduling missions and coordinating aircrews, officials at the Department of Health and Human Services activated the Emergency Medical Response component of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), deploying health and medical personnel to Haiti. However, this system had not been created to assist with disaster relief on foreign soil. American and Haitian patients who sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of the earthquake were referred to medical treatment in the United States because Haiti did not have the facilities or manpower to care for these victims. To facilitate aeromedical evacuation efforts to the United States, Air Force active-duty and air reserve component aeromedical personnel and assets were deployed to two locations: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida and Port-au-Prince, Haiti. MacDill Air Force Base worked well as a staging point for aeromedical evacuation operations because of its relative geographical closeness to Haiti and also because there was already an active-duty medical group located at the base. Personnel deployed to Port-au-Prince Toussaint Louventure International Airport in Haiti to accomplish patient stabilization and en route aeromedical operations. As mentioned prior, the Eighteenth Air Force’s 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center exercised command and control of aeromedical operations and assets and executed mission requirements, while the United States Transportation Command’s Global Patient Movement Requirement Center validated most patient movement requests. The Haitian patients flown into the United States on Air Mobility Command aircraft missions were granted medical humanitarian parole status by the United States Department of Homeland Security and allowed entry into the country by that authority.160

Initially, medical treatment facilities within the United States accepted the patients, both American and Haitian, without a well-defined fund source. This would later cause temporary postponement of expeditious evacuation efforts by mobility operators. That occurred on 28 January 2010, when United States Transportation Command staff members informed Air Mobility Command and 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center personnel that, until further notice, all military airlift flights carrying patients to the United States for treatment would

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160 Rpt (U), 601st Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report,” ca Feb 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO w/Maj Gen Douglas J. Robb, AMC/SG; Col Lawrence M. Riddles, USTRANSCOM/SG; and Col Fredrick M. Hannan Jr., AMC/SGX, 7 Apr 10.
be suspended. The notification came after the Governor of Florida, Charlie Crist, formally requested that the federal government begin assuming some of the cost of medical care. At that time, United States Transportation Command’s Global Patient Movement Requirement Center had been unable to identify other locations willing to accept these patients until such time as the Federal Government resolved the funding issues.\footnote{Article (U), AMC/PA, “Aeromedical Evacuation Brings Haiti Victims to America for Medical Care,” USAF News, 28 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO w/Maj Gen Douglas J. Robb, AMC/SG; Col Lawrence M. Riddles, USTRANSCOM/SG; and Col Fredrick M. Hannan Jr., AMC/SGX, 7 Apr 10; Rpt (U), 601st Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report,” ca Feb 10; E-Mail (U), William Dugger, 618 TACC/XOPAS to James Prisco, 618 TACC/XOPA, “Temporarily Suspending Evacuation of Haitian Patients to US,” 27 Jan 10.}

The solution to this problem came in two parts. First, the United States Department of Health and Human Services activated the Definitive Care component of the National Disaster Medical System, regulating the additional flow of patients to participating medical facilities, to include Federal Coordinating Centers for patient reception in Atlanta, Georgia, and Tampa, Florida. Second, the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response issued an amendment to the original execution order #02-2010. This amendment authorized reimbursement of Federal Coordinating Centers (FCC) for expenses related to preparations for receiving patients. Additionally, those FCCs that received incoming missions would be authorized further reimbursement for expenses related to receipt, triage, disposition, tracking, and transportation of patients. This amendment also covered reimbursement of National Disaster Medical System destination medical facilities that received eligible NDMS patients.\footnote{Executive Order (FOUO), US Department of Health & Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, “Executive Order #02-2010, Amendment 4, Haiti Earthquake,” 1 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (U), 601st Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report,” ca Feb 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Maj Gen Douglas J. Robb, AMC/SG; Col Lawrence M. Riddles, USTRANSCOM/SG; and Col Fredrick M. Hannan Jr., AMC/SGX, 7 Apr 10.}

Only patients who satisfied the medical screening criteria for evacuation and went through the National Disaster Medical System Medical Review Board prior to leaving Haiti were supposed to be considered as eligible. Patient Movement criteria as defined by United States Department of Health and Human Services had to be met as follows:

- Can reasonably survive the transport
- Has a reasonable chance that the treatment received in the continental United States will result in the ability to return to Haiti and survive
- The patient has a life-threatening injury that cannot reasonably be treated at facilities elsewhere in Haiti or in a third country, but this type of care could have been provided prior to earthquake

- The patient will not require long-term specialty care that will be unavailable in Haiti following discharge

- If there are patients with similar injuries who require specialized care, priority is given on first-come, first-served basis

- There is a receiving facility in the US willing to accept the patient

- Subjective assessments of quality of life or value to society will not be considered

- To the extent possible, required care should be prioritized for those patients seeking attention for injuries directly related to the earthquake, not as a result of chronic medical condition

- All patients will travel with a non-medical attendant unless there is a Government of Haiti Orphan Certificate \(^{163}\)

Airlift resumed on 1 February after the federal government activated the National Disaster Medical System Definitive Care component. Of significance, aeromedical evacuation of Department of Defense and other United States government employees remained constant, with no interruption during this limited suspension of other patient transport, as defense travel regulations governed their movement. \(^{164}\)

### Aeromedical Drawdown

By 11 February 2010, the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) was only scheduling one aeromedical evacuation mission per day into and out of Haiti, with some of those being cancelled due to lack of patient requirements. With the

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\(^{163}\) Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO w/Maj Gen Douglas J. Robb; AMC/SG, Col Lawrence M. Riddles, USTRANSCOM/SG; and Col Fredrick M. Hannan Jr., AMC/SGX, 7 Apr 10.

need for aeromedical evacuation flights significantly reduced, the planners and schedulers in the Center asked the 618 TACC Commander, Major General Mark S. Solo, for permission to begin executing a drawdown plan.\textsuperscript{165} The drawdown plan, initiated in the first week of March, included a transitional solution that would ensure aeromedical evacuation support availability to those Department of Defense personnel still on the ground in Haiti. The personnel on the ground in Haiti still needed a medical capability in place and ready to respond in the event of an unforeseen disaster, such as another earthquake or a building collapse. For this reason, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Deputy Command Surgeon, Colonel William A. Pollan, and the United States Transportation Command Command Surgeon, Colonel Lawrence M. Riddles, approved four AMC medical personnel to remain in place to act as gatekeepers for any new patients needing to enter the system. Two aeromedical evacuation crews and two Critical Care Air Transport Teams also remained postured to respond from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, the primary staging area stateside. This posture continued until the United States Southern Command decreased their requirements and Department of Defense presence in Haiti.\textsuperscript{166}

By May 2010, according to William S. Dugger, Deputy Division Chief of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center’s aeromedical evacuation scheduling and planning cell, 290 total patients were airlifted by 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center scheduled flights.\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} E-Mail (U), Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC to Maj Michael Kersten, 618 TACC/XOPAM, “AE Draw Down Plan,” 11 Feb 10.
\item \textsuperscript{166} E-Mail (U), Maj Charles Marek, 618 TACC/XOPA, to MSgt Wendylea Dehart, 618 TACC/XOPAM, et al, “Patient Movement Transition Plan for OUR,” 8 Mar 10.
\item \textsuperscript{167} E-Mail (U), William Dugger, 618 TACC/XOPAS, “OUR TACC Patient Evac Total,” 3 May 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.
\end{itemize}
Evacuation and Repatriation of American Citizens, Adoptees, and Human Remains

All American citizens (AMCITs) not affiliated with the government, to include relief workers and newly adopted orphans, had to go through an approval process for access to Department of Defense airlift. The initial travel authorization request came from the US Department of State’s Embassy in Haiti and was submitted to Joint Task Force (JTF)-Haiti for validation. Each request had to include individual names of persons seeking transport. The JTF-Haiti submitted the travel authorization to United States Southern Command for approval and coordination with United States Northern Command. Once approved, the travel authorization was then sent back down this chain to the US Haitian Embassy, along with flight information for the individual.168

In the first two weeks of operations, Air Mobility Command airlift had brought 2,000 American citizens out of Haiti and back to the United States. However, guidance about the evacuation procedure was not immediately available, and a couple of these airlift missions were accomplished before direction from the National Command Authority came that mandated that all of this airlift had to be done on a zero additional cost basis. This meant that these airlifts could transport these passengers to airports where the aircraft were already going to land to refuel, but not to airports where there was no other reason for the aircraft to land. The guidance was that American citizens would travel in a “Space Available” status. This direction made planning the flights very interesting. As a work-around, the flight schedulers programmed C-17 aircraft to be refueled in places that were also convenient for the disembarkation of evacuees, but not necessarily in keeping with where they would have normally refueled.169 Eventually, a total of 20,974 American citizens flew on military aircraft or military-scheduled commercial aircraft flights to various locations in United States from Haiti.170


169Article (U), AMC/PA, “Aeromedical Evacuation Brings Haiti Victims to America for Medical Care,” USAF News, 28 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.

170Rpt (U), 601st Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report,” ca Feb 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.
American Citizens’ Arrival Stateside

Most C-17 aircraft with American citizens on board were routed to Orlando-Sanford International Airport, Florida, while C-130s with these passengers were routed to Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida. Commercial and other civilian aircraft with American citizens were directed to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International, St Lucie County International Airport, Miami International Airport, Melbourne International Airport, or other airports in the state of Florida. Initially, only Florida airports were to be used for American citizen debarkation; however, several flights were tracked to other United States destinations outside Florida.\textsuperscript{171}

The 628th Air Base Wing, Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, supported the arrival of American citizens back to the US through the Emergency Repatriation Center, also located on the base. Charleston Air Force Base was selected because the 437th Airlift Wing C-17 operations were also on the base. The 628th Air Base Wing provided personnel for a Joint Reception Team and Liaison to the Charleston County Emergency Management Division. The team used the established Joint Plan for Department of Defense Non-combatant Evacuation and Repatriation operating procedures to aid the repatriation process. Incidentally, this plan was the same used in 2006 during the evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{172}

Adoptee Airlift

The smallest and most vulnerable victims of the earthquake aftermath were the children, especially those who were orphans prior to the disaster. The question of which children should be transported to the United States and which adoptions by American citizens already being processed prior to the events of 12 January 2010 should be expedited made the orphan airlift piece of the Haiti relief effort puzzle of great interest to the International media and the American general public. Many news outlets published stories during the first month of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE speculating about the role of the United States in decisions concerning placement and welfare of these tiny Haitian citizens and, in many cases, future American citizens. Although the questions concerning which orphans should stay in Haiti and which should go to the US proved to be a controversial topic, it was not something, for the most part, within the control

\textsuperscript{171}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{172}Rpt (U), AMC/A9, “Operation Unified Response, AMC Lessons Learned Report,” 29 Jul 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.
of Air Mobility Command (AMC) operators. The decision-making lead for these very high-visibility and sensitive undertakings fell to the US Department of State and the Haitian government. For AMC, the principal issue associated with the transport of orphans to the US was still one of legality. For this reason, the AMC Judge Advocate, Brigadier General Steven J. Lepper, and his staff played a key role, working with the US State Department and its Embassy in Haiti to ensure AMC’s airlift of these most precious packages stayed within the bounds of the law.\textsuperscript{173} As an enabler from Eighteenth Air Force’s Judge Advocate’s Office, Lieutenant Colonel Randon H. Draper deployed to Port-au-Prince Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti as the Staff Judge Advocate and performed a variety of legal functions for Air Force and Army personnel; however, he directed the majority of his efforts toward addressing and coordinating the legal, political, and logistical needs of airlifting adoptees and orphans. This required him to interact heavily with his counterparts at the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center Crisis Response Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, to clear authorizations for movement of Haitian orphans, first as part of the American citizen repatriation, and then, eventually, they were transported under the label “humanitarian parolees.”\textsuperscript{174} Getting these orphans who were already in the adoption process out of destroyed orphanages and vulnerable circumstances in Haiti was critical to their welfare and the needs of their adoptive US parents; however, it was likewise critical to ensure their departure was legal, as crisis situations increased the risk of human trafficking.\textsuperscript{175}

Making sure these children, who had already been through a terribly traumatic experience, were placed with families who, prior to the earthquake, had already been in the thick of the adoption process was a matter for the US State Department and the government of Haiti, but facilitating that process through airlift was part of AMC’s mission, and, according to Lieutenant General Vern M. Findley II, Vice Commander of Air Mobility Command, it was, “the right thing to do.”\textsuperscript{176}

Beginning with the first five nationally publicized adoptees departing Haiti under visas, Lieutenant Colonel Draper worked various issues to ensure legal

\textsuperscript{173} Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO w/Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.


\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{176} Intvw (U), Ellery D. Wallwork, AMC/HO w/Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, 14 Apr 10.
processing of adoptees from the US Haitian Embassy through the airport under United States responsibility and on to military and commercial flights. The legal-political climate was dynamic, at times involving congressional offices, the office of the Vice President of the United States, and state politicians. He implemented processes for children being airlifted out of Haiti under humanitarian parole, working closely with the US Haitian Embassy staff, many of whom were still dealing with their own personal trauma caused by the earthquake.\footnote{Rpt (U), AMC/A9, “Operation Unified Response, AMC Lessons Learned Report,” 29 Jul 10; Rpt (U), Lt Col Randon H. Draper, 18 AF/JA, “After Action Input for Operation Unified Response, JTF-PO/SJA,” ca Mar 10.}

The expertise of various agencies such as US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Customs and Border Protection, and additional United States Citizenship and Immigration Services staff was not available in the first two weeks to assist with adoptee airlifts. United States and Haitian immigration policies changed, at times rapidly and dramatically, with many issues unique to this operation. Despite the challenges and a chaotic environment, adoptee airlifts were executed with overwhelming success. Over 600 orphans/adoptees were transported on military aircraft, to be subsequently reunited with their adoptive families in the United States. More than 300 more were cleared through the United States military and State Department processes at the airport, to be flown on civilian aircraft.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Human Remains Repatriation**

Several American citizens (AMCITs) presumed dead in Haiti, some in undocumented locations, were missing after the earthquake. On 22 January 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the request by the US Department of State to provide mortuary services for and transportation of human remains (HR) of American citizens from Haiti. US Department of Defense, US Department of Health and Human Services, and US Department of State officials coordinated options for the repatriation of the remains. Efforts to determine final disposition of the remains began once the remains arrived in the US.\footnote{Rpt (U), USTRANSCOM/SG, “Executive Summary, Operation Unified Response, DoD Support to Haitian Earthquake,” 26 Jan 10.}

However, the initial processes and decisions for transport of these remains had yet to be solidified early on in the aftermath of the earthquake and the first couple of days of the relief efforts. Although orders from the President directed the military to help with relief efforts, the questions of “what could the military legally do” and
“how would the airlift be paid for” were still to be answered, along with questions regarding where in the US the remains would be delivered. Legally, the defense travel regulations did not allow for the transport of a non-government American citizen’s remains on a military aircraft from a foreign country to the United States. Regardless, Air Mobility Command began planning the airlift of human remains and actually executed the first airlift of human remains to the United States from Haiti prior to these determinations being made and official guidance being published. Eventually, guidance came from the US State Department concerning the transport of American citizens on a non-reimbursable, non-interference, zero-cost basis. Then, the issue still existed of where to take the human remains. These un-embalmed remains could not be processed at just any port of debarkation in the United States. The mortuary at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, was the only facility with the proper resources and capability to handle and store this particular cargo. Incidentally, some human remains were manifested on aircraft transiting Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina. This caused a reaction cycle to plan for the reception of unknown multiple HRs, although no HRs remained overnight at Charleston Air Force Base.\footnote{\textsuperscript{180}Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10.}

The eventual arrival of the human remains at Dover was actually the end state of this mission, which had several components, beginning with search teams validating US Department of State-reported locations of AMCIT remains. The recovery of the remains of American citizens was a multi-phased process, with special sensitivity given to the government of Haiti and the Haitian remains that would most likely also be discovered in the process. In total, mobility assets repatriated the remains of nine American citizens killed by the earthquake in Haiti.\footnote{\textsuperscript{181}Rpt (U), USTRANSCOM/SG, “Executive Summary, Operation Unified Response, DoD Support to Haitian Earthquake,” 26 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Kathy S. Gunn, AMC/HO, w/Col Brian A. Reno, 618 TACC/XOC, 4 Aug 10; Rpt (U), 601st Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division, “Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report,” ca Feb 10.}
Gauging Air Mobility Command’s Contribution

After the transition from emergency relief to sustainment operations, as well as after the seaport was opened, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE required less support from Air Mobility Command (AMC). However, AMC leadership, planners, maintainers, and aircrews continued to monitor the situation. As stipulated in the US Southern Command’s five-phased operations plan, the end state of US involvement would occur when the Haitian government was re-established and able to provide the infrastructure and basic services.

Until that time, situations still arose which kept the planners busy. Throughout the end of the relief phase, AMC continued to maintain a capability and preparedness for additional aerial deliveries. By way of example, one very large item of relief equipment, a semi-truck-drawn field kitchen offered by the Mexican government, proved difficult to move. With the decision to avoid C-5 operations into Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Haiti, AMC looked at flying the kitchen from Mexico City to Jacksonville, Florida, for transloading to a ship. A five-person aerial port team from the 621st Contingency Response Wing at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, traveled to Mexico City to do the initial evaluation of the airlift requirements. They performed the air transportability test loading in three days versus the normal four to six weeks. For movement in a C-5, the kitchen required 20,000 to 25,000 pounds of shoring, which led one planner to comment during an Eighteenth Air Force staff meeting, “That’s a big enchilada.” AMC finally airlifted the kitchen to Jacksonville over two sorties and closed out the move on 8 February 2010. By that date, the Port-au-Prince seaport was repaired and functioning, and much of the humanitarian and sustainment supplies went to Haiti via ship.

On Wednesday, 27 January 2010, the Air Mobility Command Crisis Action Team (CAT) stood down, with only the CAT executive officer continuing watches. Two days later, the CAT returned to daytime-only minimal operations manning. The Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, aerial port operations started winding

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182Msg (FOUO), CDRUSSOUTHCOM to CJCS et al, “CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD/CDRUSSOUTHCOM Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief EXORD,” 161330Z Jan 10, info used is not FOUO; Slides (Pre-Decisional/FOUO), Ms. Shelly Alvirez, USSOUTHCOM/SC-PS(L), “USSOUTHCOM Strategic Framework: Operation Unified Response, Transition to Long-Term Engagement,” 6 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10.

183Brfg (U), AMC A4 Logistics at A-Staff Meeting, 5 Feb 05; Brfg (S/NF/DECL-8 Feb 35), DoD, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Haiti Earthquake Situation Update-08 Feb 10 (U),” 8 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified; Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10.
down, although the 482d Fighter Wing continued to offer ground refueling services for transiting C-130s. Through 2 February, Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (AFSOUTH) reported that 2,033 military and civilian airlift missions of all types had moved 7,349 passengers and 10,237 short tons through Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport. San Isidro Air Base, Dominican Republic, received a total of 36 airlift missions, 71 passengers, and 543 short tons, while Maria Montez International Airport at Barahona, Dominican Republic, prior to its closure, had accepted 47 missions, 100 passengers, and 612 short tons of equipment and aid.184

During the late January period, AMC started releasing the borrowed C-17As back to their commands, Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). For example, on 27 January, one of the 15th Airlift Wing’s C-17s flew its last Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE mission and then returned to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, as part of the orderly transition to steady state sustainment. However, AMC planners continued to monitor the situation to ensure that the steady state transition did not release aircraft too soon.185 Still, as Major General Mark S. Solo, commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), described, AMC made every effort to get the planes back to their home station: “We watched closely and released aircraft and crews back to PACAF and AETC as soon as possible, to let them get back to their day-to-day missions.”186

Removing aircraft significantly impacted training, especially those from AETC’s 97th Air Mobility Wing at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. AETC specifically delayed aircrew training in order to ensure support to the Haiti operation. Further, the return of the C-17s coincided with proof that Mother Nature still had a sense of humor—Altus Air Force Base was hit with a major ice storm. Although only gone for two weeks, the lost training was not fully recovered until April.187

184 E-Mail (U), Lt Gen Vern M. Findley II, AMC/CV, to Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash, AMC/A3, “AMC CAT,” 27 Jan 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10; E-Mail (U), Charles J. Faulk, AMC/A3XO, to ACC Operations Center et al, “HQ AMC CAT Deactivation--Operation Unified Response,” 29 Jan 10; Rpt (S/DECL-12 Feb 35), 612 AOC, “AFSOUTH Daily CFACC Update (U),” 12 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified. See Appendix 2 for airlift totals for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

185 Historians’ Notes (U), AMC/HO, “2010 Humanitarian Operations AMC and 18 AF Staff Update Briefings,” 14 Jan-25 Apr 10; Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10.

186 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10.

As flights to Haiti decreased, AFSOUTH started releasing augmentee and contingency personnel at the various locations. In summarizing the effort involved in opening the support airfields in the Dominican Republic and south Florida, Colonel Daniel R. Miller, AMC Deputy Director of Mobility Forces at AFSOUTH, highly praised the contribution of the contingency response units, calling it “...a phenomenal effort. Most of the mobility air force doesn’t understand the contingency response wings and what they provide. They’re slowly figuring it out, but, now, I think they’ve really got it.”  

The 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center’s Crisis Response Cell (CRC) gradually reduced its watch personnel, leading to its inactivation on 11 February 2010. At full manning, the CRC operated 24-hours a day for 30 days straight, setting something of a contemporary record. By comparison, during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, the CRC operated for 23 straight days.

In describing the impact Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE had on the 618 TACC, General Solo commented:

It definitely strained us as an AOC [Air and Space Operations Center], but we brought in additional Guardsmen and Reservists, which we have the ability to do. We changed the shifts from 8 hours to 12 hours for a lot of folks; a lot of folks didn’t get the three-day weekend that was in there. But everyone understood the need and the great humanitarian crisis that the world was faced with. There were really no complaints. We had lots of folks volunteering. Towards the end of the 30 days, we were able to whittle it down from 15 to 20 people in the CRC to 10 to 15. The last several days, we were down to a handful of people, including the CRC director and four or five people with him. It’s a great capability, and it allows us to operate the rest of the worldwide missions from out on the floor. It did remarkably well for us.

On 5 February 2010, the United States Southern Command released Fragmentary Order 25 to its standing operations orders, which notified all involved parties of the formal transition to Phase II, sustainment. A subsequent fragmentary order directed the participants to develop and implement a concept

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188 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Col Daniel R. Miller, AFSOUTH Deputy DIRMOBFOR, 18 Feb 10, pp 19-20.


190 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Mark S. Solo, 618 TACC/CC, 5 May 10, pp 3-4.
of operations for the sustainment portion of the relief effort. While Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE officially continued, the initial priority, which was to provide immediate relief under extremely difficult circumstances, was over.\textsuperscript{191}

Remarkably, AMC got through this rigorous operation with only three aircraft breaking down. Considering the tight operations at Port-au-Prince, Barahona, and San Isidro, that in itself was remarkable and a credit to the Command, its aircrews, and, particularly, the aircraft maintainers. On 28 January, a C-17A, tail number 97-0045, experienced a manifold failure at the Port-au-Prince airport. Maintainers completed repairs by 1 February. On 2 February, a C-130H, tail number 92-0547, developed an engine fuel leak at Palm Beach International Airport, Florida. Maintainers repaired and launched the aircraft on 4 February. On 11 February, the crew of a C-5B, tail number 85-0003, detected a broken second stage fan blade, which required an engine change at Jacksonville, Florida. The plane was back in the air the following day.\textsuperscript{192}

On 5 February 2010, General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Commander, Air Mobility Command, visited Pope Air Force Base and Fort Bragg, both in North Carolina. During the course of the visit, Lieutenant General Frank G. Helmick, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, presented General Johns with an “Iron Mike,” a replica of the 15-foot and 1-inch statue of the airborne paratrooper memorial at Fort Bragg. In a brief ceremony, General Helmick relayed his Corps’ and the 82d Airborne Division’s thanks to AMC. “AMC’s effort to deploy the Global Response Force and the XVIII Airborne Corps Command Post was incredible. The Airmen, pilots, and flight crews were phenomenal, flexible, professional, and effective.”\textsuperscript{193}

“Phenomenal, flexible, professional, and effective”—an appropriate summation of Air Mobility Command’s response to a very tragic Tuesday in January in the island nation of Haiti. Major General Brooks L. Bash, AMC Director

\textsuperscript{191}FRAGO (FOUO), USSOUTHCOM, “FRAGO 025 (Transition to Phase II) to CDRUSSOUTHCOM OPORD 01-10, Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief Efforts (Operation Unified Response),” 5 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; FRAGO (FOUO), USSOUTHCOM, “FRAGO 026 (Sustainment Guidance) to CDRUSSOUTHCOM OPORD 01-10, Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief Efforts (Operation Unified Response),” 5 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO.

\textsuperscript{192}Brfg (S/DECL-1 Feb 35), 618 TACC XOP/XON, “Operations Summary-01 Feb 10,” 1 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified; Brfg (S/DECL-5 Feb 35), 618 TACC XOP/XON, “Operations Summary-04 Feb 10,” 5 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified; Brfg (S/DECL-12 Feb 35), 618 TACC XOP/XON, “Operations Summary-12 Feb 10,” 12 Feb 10, info used is Unclassified.

\textsuperscript{193}Article (U), Laura McAndrews, AMC/PA, “Army Presents ‘Iron Mike’ to AMC for Haiti Airlift Support,” 9 Feb 10. Fort Bragg dedicated the original “Iron Mike” statue on 23 September 1961. It now stands in the traffic circle between the fort’s officers’ club and post headquarters. Article (U), XVIII Airborne Corps Public Affairs website, “Iron Mike--the Airborne Trooper Statue,” 6 Dec 06.
of Operations, attributed three enablers to AMC’s success. First, the Haitians allowed the US to run the airport, which increased the throughput capacity. Second, the Haitians allowed the US to control the airspace, thereby organizing the relief effort and increasing the effectiveness of the aircraft slot system. Finally, the Department of State and Department of Defense policy decisions, worked with the international legal perspective, placed the right emphasis on aid, orphans, human remains, aeromedical evacuation, and American citizen repatriation. Until the seaport was opened, all remained dependant on the airlift capacity.194

Lieutenant General Vern M. “Rusty” Findley II, AMC Vice Commander, summed it up:

I couldn’t be prouder of how our command and how the young men and women of our command responded to this and what we offered as part of the team there to make this a success. It was folks here working around the clock in the 618 TACC; it was folks on the ground in Haiti; and it was all those great Airmen that are out there flying, fixing, and supporting the mission. The armada of C-17s that we accumulated was just incredible--how we were able to marshal those assets together in the time that we did it to provide the kind of response that we did. It was a phenomenal effort.195

194 Intvw (U), Mark L. Morgan, AMC/HO, with Maj Gen Brooks L. Bash and Brig Gen Bradley R. Pray, AMC/A3, 13 Apr 10.

Epilogue

As Congress considers the Administration’s proposal to dedicate $1.13 billion to rebuild Haiti, some people may ask whether it makes sense to put so much money into Haiti, in a time of tight budgets and unemployment here at home. Foreign assistance is a very tiny percentage of the overall federal budget, less than one percent—but I still think this is a very valid question. The answer is this: we can’t afford not to invest in rebuilding Haiti.

Herman Melville once wrote: “We cannot live for ourselves alone. Our lives are connected by a thousand invisible threads, and along these sympathetic fibers, our actions run as causes and return to us as results.”

As they mature, people--and nations--progress from dependence, to independence, to interdependence. Just as there are things that no one individual can achieve alone, there are certain universal and necessary goods that no single country can achieve by itself.

We Americans have a thousand threads binding us to Haiti. There are threads of family and of friendship. There are threads of economy and culture. Some of these threads are the threats that both countries face, from crime and insecure borders. There are also the threads of deep shared history. The people of Haiti, the first black republic in the world, fought alongside Americans in 1779 and helped the US win its own independence.

We cannot isolate ourselves from the world. That is true of us as individuals, and it is true of us as a country.

It isn’t just that Haiti needs to become more prosperous, more stable, and more democratic. We need Haiti to become more prosperous, more stable, and more democratic. It has real world consequences for our collective security, health, and economy when extreme poverty and misery are right on our doorstep. We also become less of a people, less of a country, if we allow our neighbors and friends to starve, sicken, and die.

US Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten
Commencement Address, University of Miami, Ohio
16 April 2010
### APPENDIX 1

**United States Air Force Active-Duty and Air Reserve Component Organizations and Commercial Air Carriers Participating in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJCOM</th>
<th>Wing</th>
<th>Installation</th>
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<td>43d Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>60th Air Mobility Wing</td>
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<td>437th Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>615th Contingency Response Wing</td>
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<td>621st Contingency Response Wing</td>
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<td>107th Airlift Wing</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>130th Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>136th Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>139th Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>152d Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>PACAF</td>
<td>3d Wing</td>
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<td>15th Air Mobility Wing</td>
<td>Hickam AFB HI</td>
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NOTES: AETC: Air Education and Training Command; AFMC: Air Force Materiel Command; AFRC: Air Force Reserve Command; AFSOC: Air Force Special Operations Command; AMC: Air Mobility Command; ANG: Air National Guard; ANGB: Air National Guard Base; AP: Airport; ARB: Air Reserve Base; ARS: Air Reserve Station; IAP: International Airport; MAJCOM: major command; NAS: Naval Air Station; PACAF: Pacific Air Forces

SOURCE: Rpt (FOUO), 43AW/HO, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE,” ca May 10, pp 20-21, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Feb 2010 to 28 Feb 2010-Pivot Table Data,” 5 Mar 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Mar 2010 to 31 Mar 2010-Pivot Table Data,” 8 Apr 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Apr 2010 to 30 Apr 2010-Pivot Table Data,” 4 May 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 May 2010 to 31 May 2010-Pivot Table Data,” 7 Jun 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jun 2010 to 30 Jun 2010-Pivot Table Data,” 12 Jun 10, info used is not FOUO.
APPENDIX 2

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE
618th Tanker Airlift Control Center-Controlled Airlift Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
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<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>16,441</td>
<td>8,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>5,332</td>
<td>4,346</td>
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<tr>
<td>January-February Totals</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>21,773</td>
<td>12,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>3,740</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>277</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>306</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>March-June Totals</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td>1,341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Totals</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>27,223</td>
<td>14,083</td>
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</table>

NOTE: At the end of June 2010, the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center stopped documenting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE as a separate operation and started incorporating Haitian mission data into the special assignment airlift mission statistics.

SOURCE: Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jan 2010 to 31 Jan 2010,” 8 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Feb 2010 to 28 Feb 2010,” 5 Mar 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Mar 2010 to 31 Mar 2010,” 6 Apr 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Apr 2010 to 30 Apr 2010,” 4 May 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 May 2010 to 31 May 2010,” 7 Jun 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jun 2010 to 30 Jun 2010,” 12 Jul 10, info used is not FOUO.
## APPENDIX 3

**Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE**

618th Tanker Airlift Control Center-Controlled Airlift Totals

By Aircraft Type

### January-February 2010

<table>
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<th>Aircraft Type</th>
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<th>Short Tons</th>
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<td>95</td>
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<td>C-9C</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>C-17A</td>
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<td>14,075</td>
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<td>KC-135R/T</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,288</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,773</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,742</strong></td>
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</table>

### March-June 2010

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
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<tr>
<td>C-5A/B</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>188</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-9C</td>
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<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-17A</td>
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<td>524</td>
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<td>4,539</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>292</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,450</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,341</strong></td>
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### Grand Totals

|                | 2,580   | 27,223   | 14,086     |

**NOTE:** By the end of June 2010, the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center stopped documenting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE as a separate operation and started incorporating Haitian mission data into the special assignment airlift mission statistics.
SOURCE: Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jan 2010 to 31 Jan 2010,” 8 Feb 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Feb 2010 to 28 Feb 2010,” 5 Mar 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Mar 2010 to 31 Mar 2010,” 6 Apr 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Apr 2010 to 30 Apr 2010,” 4 May 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 May 2010 to 31 May 2010,” 7 Jun 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (FOUO), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operational Highlights, 1 Jun 2010 to 30 Jun 2010,” 12 Jul 10, info used is not FOUO; Rpt (U), 618 TACC/XOND, “AMC Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Movement-January 2010,” 3 Sep 10.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>ADVON</td>
<td>Advance Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Aeromedical Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEG</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFNORTH</td>
<td>Air Forces, US Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFNSEP</td>
<td>Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF SOUTH</td>
<td>Air Forces, US Southern Command</td>
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<td>American Citizen</td>
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<td>Air Mobility Division</td>
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<td>Air Mobility Wing</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Air and Space Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>Aerial Port of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Aerial Port of Debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Air Reserve Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Air Reserve Station</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Crisis Action Team</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>[US] Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCATT</td>
<td>Critical Care Air Transport Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFACC</td>
<td>Combined Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>CF.COM</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command</td>
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<td>CHOP</td>
<td>change of operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Contingency Response Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Contingency Response Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>Contingency Response Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Combat Readiness Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRW</td>
<td>Contingency Response Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRMOBFOR</td>
<td>Director of Mobility Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support to Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMEDS</td>
<td>Expeditionary Medical Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLO</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Repatriation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Emergency and Special Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXORD</td>
<td>Execute Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Coordinating Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATES</td>
<td>Global Air Transportation Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDSS</td>
<td>Global Decision Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPMRC</td>
<td>Global Patient Movement Requirement Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFOCC</td>
<td>Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>US Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>human remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>US Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIT</td>
<td>Just-In-Time [training]</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-H</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-PO</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-Port Opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRS</td>
<td>Logistics Readiness Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOG</td>
<td>Maximum on Ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPR</td>
<td>Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOSC</td>
<td>Network Operations and Security Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTAM</td>
<td>Notice to Airmen</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUR</td>
<td>Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTDO</td>
<td>Prepare to Deploy Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMCC</td>
<td>Regional Air Movement Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPOE</td>
<td>Rapid Port Opening Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SDDOC</td>
<td>USSOUTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Security Forces Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPR</td>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>Tanker Airlift Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALCE</td>
<td>Tanker-Airlift Control Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULN</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOCO</td>
<td>Vocal Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARNORD</td>
<td>Warning Order</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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Back Cover: The Haitian flag flies in front of the Haiti National Palace following the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 12 January 2010. (US Navy photo/MCC James G. Pinsky)