Safety in the Hands of the Instructor

The present and future of our capability to "Fly, Fight, and Win" is directly in the hands of USAF Aircrew Instructors. In 2012, while still at a Wing, we discovered that 12 of the 14 most recent and significant mishaps in my airframe had Instructor Pilots (IPs) on board at the time of the mishap. We must ensure our instructors have the right tool set to train operators and oversee operations. Everyone is a product and reflection of their training. So how do we train the new guys (and gals) and more importantly, how do we train the instructors? Here are a few thoughts from a former major weapons system (MWS) and undergraduate pilot training (UPT) instructor about instructors evaluating their own abilities. Fair warning, nothing here is new or cosmic, only worth consideration at 1 G and 0 KIAS (knots indicated air speed).
 

First, a core competency of a good instructor is the ability to conduct Root Cause Analysis. Unfortunately, I have witnessed too many instructors who are excellent evaluators but lack the basic ability to teach. They can tell you exactly what parameter was not met but not why the student didn't perform as expected. An example: a student slows below the minimum maneuvering speed while executing a steep turn on a low-level training sortie.

· Did the student recognize the airspeed? (cross check)

· Does the studet know the minimum required or procedure? (general knowledge)

· Have you seen the student perform a similar task or maneuver to standard? (stick and rudder skills)

· Did the student care that he or she violated the standard? (air discipline)

· Did the student's inputs follow a typical and expected pattern? For instance, "power, pitch, and roll?" (technique)

· Was something else occurring? Perhaps a threat maneuver or radio call? (distraction and prioritization)

· Were the rest of the crew and aircraft systems supporting the student as expected? (task saturation)

· Was the student directive for task or system management? (cockpit resource management)

This all leads to a common error of young or inexperienced instructors citing "low SA" (situational awareness) as a cause for flight deviations. SA is a symptom or product of another root cause. An instructor must critically analyze the factors that have led up to the performance and not just record and regurgitate the result.

Next, an unfortunate paradox for instructors is the Halo versus Horns condition (a cognitive expectation bias), which is the perception, built on previous experience, that one student is above or below average. This can lead to complacency or exhaustive hyper-vigilance. Neither is desired, but the halo, or perceived better student, may be more dangerous, as this will cause the instructor to be complacent and potentially not intervene in a timely fashion. It is fair to ask instructors, "Have you fostered an artificial infallible image of yourself or others in your student?" They must never be allowed to take on the mindset of a passenger while the IP is operating the aircraft. Instructors need to remain engaged and NOT hesitate or fail to ask questions to expand their own knowledge base when others are flying.

Additionally, Confirmation Bias occurs when you see only the information that supports your previous assumptions. This may have been a factor in several mishaps. In one example, an aircrew landed on a snow-covered runway without changing their Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) to reflect it. How did this occur? They expected a clear runway (as reported), and their visual observation did not key them into this. So, what's the point? What can we say about this? Not much really, other than when the hair on the back of your neck starts to stand up, coldly reassess available information.

Further, automation can be a blessing and a curse. When things get busy on the flight deck, my old Tweet IP used to say, "Step 1, wind the clock ...," which is a technique to slow things down and think through your actions. Using automation to help manage basic tasks (if appropriate) is one technique to free brain cells to deal with an emergency or allow for instruction. The downside, of course, is over-reliance. The airlines addressed this recently at the Aviation Infoshare (FAA Safety Conference) and correctly analyzed the need to spend time hand-flying under normal operations to maintain your basic skill set. The first time you hand-fly an approach or departure in six months shouldn't be when you've just lost a motor or primary flight control mode.

Another consideration is your "window"--the point where instruction ends and immediate corrective action takes over. As a UPT IP, you have surely considered how far to let a student go before taking the aircraft and fixing it yourself. And there must be balance. People do not learn if you constantly fix things for them. Simple communication ahead of time can avert issues when this arises, such as "I'll let you get 5 degrees, 5 knots, or 100 feet off, and then I'll take it at 10, 10, or 150." Expectation management is critical for quality instruction, as is critical feedback of performance. What do both of these have in common? Timely and effective communication.

Finally, taking from the last bit here, is the importance of communication empowerment. Setting the right tone allows all of those involved to speak up and recognize an issue, potentially avoiding a mishap as well as ensuring learning is occurring. Encouraging discussion--not the time-honored instructor tradition of fear, ridicule, and sarcasm--can prevent the team from lock-step walking off the cliff. Your tools are "knock it off" and "go-around." Remember, you are an instructor, but you are not infallible; if you make an error, own up to it and move on. Your students will respect you more for it. They are students, not morons. On more than one occasion, I have had to say, "Well, that's an excellent example of what not to do. Let me show you a better demo."